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I. INTRODUCTION 
T HERE are a number of instances in which a federal court as­serts personal jurisdiction by service of process beyond the 
territorial limits of the state in which it sits. The most common 
examples of these assertions of jurisdiction are the use of a state's 
long-arm statute l and the "bulge" provision of the federal rules.:! 
But, in addition, there are a number of statutes by which Con-
• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. A.B .. 
Colgate University, 1968; J.D., Boston College, 1971. 
I. FED. R. ClV. P. 4(e); e.g., United States Y. First Nat'l City Bank. 379 U.S. 
378,381 (1965). 
2. FED. R. ClV. P. 4(£). See il/fra text accompanying' notes 21-29. 
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gress has authorized nationwide service of process in particular 
circumstances. ;3 
It is generally accepted that Congress may authorize expan­
sion of a federal district court's jurisdiction beyond the territorial 
limits of the states in which it sits, including authorization of ex­
traterritorial service ofprocess.4 However, a question which must 
be considered is whether there are any constitutional limitations 
on this congressional power and, if so, what those limitations are. 
For absent any restrictions, defendants could find themselves 
placed in the difficult position of having to litigate a case in a dis­
trict far from home, with which they have no connection. 
This article will begin by examining the principles which gov­
ern the assertion of personal jurisdiction in federal court. It will 
analyze examples of situations in which nationwide service of pro­
cess has been authorized for the purpose of establishing the para­
digm by which such authorizations are justified and limited. 
Finally, this article will suggesl that the prevailing paradigm is in­
adequate and it will offer an alternative for dealing with this prob­
lem in the future. 
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS IN FEDERAL COURT 
A. Personal jurisdiction in Federal Courts 
In order for a federal court to assert personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant, it must have power to do so. The defendant 
must be amenable to service under a statute or rule of court 
which authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction, and that assertion of 
jurisdiction must be consistent with the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment. 5 Beyond this, service of process must be exer­
cised in a manner both consistent with the authorizing provision 
3. For a reference to statutes authorizing such nationwide service of pro­
cess, see illfra note 30. 
4. E.g .. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree. 326 U.S. 438 (l9-l6): 
Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619 (1925); Peterfi'eund, FI'{/fml 
jurisdirtioll alld Pmrtire, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 491, 499 n.65 (1957). 
5. E.g., Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. -l0-l. -l09 
(1987); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,221 (1977) (Brennan,].. concurring' in 
part and dissenting in part); Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511. 
514 (5th Cir. 1982); Edward]. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co .. 
289 F. Supp. 38 I. 390 (S.D. Ohio, 19(7). Oil/IIi Capital does lea\'e open the pos­
sibility of a common law service provision. For more detail 011 this point, see 
illfra note 17. While most personal jurisdiction cases revolve around state coun 
jurisdiction and are restrict.ed by the fourteenth amendment, it is the fi.fth 
amendment which places due process limits on the COllrts of the federal go\'ern­
ment. E.g.. Mariash v. MorriH, 496 F.2d 1138. 1143 (2d Cir. 1974). 














1988] NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS 3 
and reasonably calculated to notify the defendant of the action.o 
The authority of a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a 
defendant was historically limited as a general rule to persons 
found or living in the judicial district. 7 In Robertson v. Railroad La­
bor Board H the Supreme Court stated that Congress had the power 
to authorize the process of federal courts to run throughout the 
United StatesY The Court went on to rule that such authoriza­
tion had not been given in that case, which was a suit under the 
Transportation Act of 1920. As such, "the general rule [that] the 
jurisdiction of a district court in personam [was] limited to the dis­
trict of which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which he can be 
found" was to govern the outcome. IO 
This concept of the limits of service has been broadened by 
the adoption of rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The primary function of rule 4 is to set forth the appropriate 
manner of service of process in federal courts. I I It expands on 
the Robertson rule by stating in subsection (f) that the basic reach 
of federal process covers the entire state in which the court is lo­
cated when two or more judicial districts are located therein. 12 
Beyond this, rule 4(f) makes clear that service may be accom­
plished beyond the territorial limits of the state in which the dis­
trict court sits if it is authorized by a federal statute or by the 
rules. 13 This provision must be read in conjunction with rule 
6. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
7. Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838); Foster, LOlIg-.-lnll 
jurisdiction ill Federal Courts, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 9, 16 (1969). This was the situa­
tion prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Fos­
ter, supra, at 16. 
8. 268 U.S. 619 (1925). 
9. !d. at 622 (citing Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838); 
United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569,604 (1878)). This congres­
sional power arises out of its general supervisory authority under article III, sec­
tion 1 of the United States Constitution. United States v. Union Pac. R.R .. 98 
U.S. 569,602 (1878). 
10. Rouertsoll, 268 U.S. at 627. In Oil/IIi CapitaIIlltemationalT'. Rudolf Wolff & 
Co. the Supreme Court questioned whether Robertson has been undercut by sub­
sequent decisions which have moved away from principles of territoriality. Hav­
ing raised the question, however, it then stated that it expressed "no view as to 
the continued validity of Robertsoll S rationales." 108 S. Ct. 404, 412 n.1 0 (1987). 
II. 2J. MOORE,J. LUCAS, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON, l\'IOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC­
TICE ~I 4.02[1], [21 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOORE]. 
12. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). The 
relevant part of FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) is set forth iI/1m in the text accompanying 
note 21. 
13. A detailed explanation of the relation of rules 4(e) and 4(f) is sct forth 
in 2 J. MOORt:, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.3212] 
(2d cd. 1986) Ihereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]. 
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4(e), which deals with extraterritorial service of process and pro­
vides that, in the absence of a federal statute, extraterritorial ser­
vice may be accomplished as provided by the rules. 14 The second 
sentence of the rule incorporates by reference the state court 
practice of the state in which the district court sits as an alterna­
tive means of service. 
One other provision of rule 4(f) is relevant to this discussion. 
The second sentence of that section effectively provides for the 
expansion of jurisdiction in the appropriate circumstances by a 
100 mile "bulge" from the place at which the courthouse is lo­
cated, even though service may thereby be effected beyond the 
state's boundaries, as long as it is within the United States. 15 
In summary, rule 4 effectively states that a district court may 
assert jurisdiction over any party within the state in which it sits, 
and beyond the state's territorial boundaries if service is author­
ized by state law, a special federal statute or the 100 mile "bulge" 
provISIOn. 
While courts have traditionally stated that rule 4 attempts to 
14. FED. R. elv. P. 4(e) provides: 
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereun­
der provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in 
lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the 
state in which the district court is held, service may be made under the 
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, 
if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a 
manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the 
state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a sum­
mons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party 
not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or 
notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason 
of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property lo­
cated within the state, service may in either case be made under the 
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule. 
This rule was read in conjunction with former FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(7) which ap­
peared to be primarily concerned with use of state law for serving defendants 
who were inhabitants of or found within the state in which the district court sat. 
4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1114, at 241-
42 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter WRIGHT]; Foster,Judicial E(OI/omy; Fairlless al/d COI/­
venience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 94 
n.63 (1968). However, there was apparently no intention to draw a sharp line 
between the two rules, but rather they were intended to overlap. WRIGHT. supm. 
at 243; Kaplan, Amendments of the Fedeml Rules of Civil Proadure. 1961-1963 (1), 77 
HARV. L. REV. 60 I, 619-22 (1964); The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure eliminated rule 4(d)(7), and incorporated its substance into 
rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supm note 13, ~ 4.08[31. The 
new rule should be interpreted in the same way as its predecessor. /d. 
15. E.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412. 416 (5th Cir. 1979) 
("[T]he I 00 mile bulge provision has effectively expanded the territorial juris­
diction of a federal district court beyond state lines .... "). For a discussion of 
the policy underlying the "bulge" provision, see il/fra note 22. 
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do no more than set forth the appropriate manner of service of 
process,IG it is clear that it goes further. It incorporates federal 
and state standards authorizing assertions of jurisdiction: that is, 
not merely how service is accomplished but whether a defendant 
is amenable to suit. In addition, by providing for service through­
out the state and within the 100 mile "bulge," it is authorizing, 
without other reference, some assertions of jurisdiction. 
While typical questions of jurisdiction relate to whether the 
defendant has sufficient connection with the state where the dis­
trict court sits to warrant service,17 this is not always the case. 
Two exceptions to this generalization are the "bulge" provision 
included in rule 4(f) 18 and those federal statutes which authorize 
nationwide service of process. 19 In these situations, the territorial 
limits of effective service are expanded beyond the boundaries of 
the state in which the district court sits. As numerous authorities 
have pointed out, the fifth amendment due process clause pro­
vides the applicable constitutional standard in reviewing these as­
sertions of jurisdiction since we are concerned with the federal 
16. E.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir.), mt. 
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966). There is a minority view, however, which sees Rule 
4 as a basis for asserting jurisdiction. Berger, Acquiring in Personam jurisdiction ill 
Federal Question Cases: Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure -I, 
1982 UTAH L. REV. 285, 288-93; Foster, supra note 7, at 16-17 n.28. 
17. The several types of cases which can be brought in federal court usually 
require this sort of "sufficient connection." In diversity cases it is generally ac­
cepted that state law governs and the federal court must determine if the de­
fendant is amenable to suit under state law, and whether that is consistent with 
due process. Arrowsmith v. United Press InCl, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). 
ContraJaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960); Green, 
Federal jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 V AND. L. REV. 967 
(1961). In a federal question case, the federal court may only assert jurisdiction 
to the same extent as a state court, if pursuant to the second sentence of rule 
4(e), it makes use of the state's long-arm statute because of the absence of a 
federal statute providing for service. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 
108 S. Ct. 404, 409-11 (1987); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 
1264-69 (5th Cir. 1983); Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 514-
17 (5th Cir. 1982). In Omni Capital the requirements of the applicable state long­
arm statute were not met, and it was suggested that the federal courts develop 
their own rule to authorize service. The Supreme Court refused to decide 
whether it could "fashion a rule authorizing service of process," because it felt 
that even if it had such power, it was not prepared to exercise it in the case 
before it. This was because it had always been assumed that statutory authoriza­
tion was necessary, and it was not prepared to go beyond this assumption since 
it felt that Congress was in a better position to structure service rules, and that it 
would be appropriate to show "circumspection ... in going beyond what Con­
gress had authorized." 108 S. Ct. at 411-13. 
18. For a discussion of the "bulge" provision, see infra notes 21-29 and 
accompanying text. See also Berger, supra note 16, at 318-19 n.157. 
19. For a general reference to statutes authorizing nationwide service of 
process, see infra note 30. 
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government's power to require a defendant to appear. 20 The 
question is what is the appropriate limiting standard under the 
fifth amendment. To fully analyze this question it is necessary to 
consider examples of such assertions of jurisdiction, the reasons 
for them and the congressional authority to allow them. 
B. Amenability Without Reference to State Boundaries 
1. Rule 4(j)-The "Bulge" Service Provision 
Rule 4(f) provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
[P]ersons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 
14, or as additional parties to a pending action or a 
counterclaim or cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19, 
may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) 
of subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside the 
state but within the United States that are not more than 
100 miles from the place in which the action is com-
menced. 21 
The purpose behind this provIsIon, according to the advisory 
committee, was "to promote the objective of enabling the court 
to determine entire controversies" by expanding personal juris­
diction over a limited class of additional parties.22 Implicit in the 
advisory committee's understanding of the rule is a concern over 
whether this purpose is a sufficient justification for extending ju­
risdiction beyond the boundaries of the state in which the district 
court is sitting based solely on the party's connection with the 
lawsuit, irrespective of the quality of contacts with the forum. Be-
20. E.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd 01/ other 
groullds sub 110m., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Engineering' Equip. Co. 
v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Foster, supra note 7, at 31; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 2 comment b (1969); RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment f (1980). 
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). The provision was added by an amendment to the 
rule in 1963. MOORE, supra note II, ~ 4.42[2.-3]. It was amended to its present 
form in 1966. Id. at ~ 4.01[26]. 
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment subdi­
vision (f) [hereinafter Committee's Note]. As the advisory committee pointed 
out, this provision'S primary value is "in metropolitan areas spanning more than 
one State." [d. Courts have generally agreed that the rule provides for both the 
manner of service of process and the amenability of the party to service. The 
only limitation imposed is that the party served must have minimum contacts 
either with the "bulge," e.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 415-17 
(5th Cir. 1979), or the entire state in which service is accomplished. E.g., Cole­
man v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 251-53 (2d Cir. 
1968); MOORE, supra note II, ~ 4.42[2.-3] at 4-402 n.22. 
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yond this the committee had to consider whether the Supreme 
Court could authorize such an expansion of jurisdiction. 
Regarding the appropriateness of such a rule, the committee 
indicated that it would operate in only a limited number of situa­
tions. 2 :l In addition, the increased territorial range would not be 
a hardship to parties in light of modern systems of communica­
tions and travel,24 Regarding the Supreme Court's power to au­
thorize such a provision, the committee simply cited Mississippi 
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree. 25 
In Murphree the United States Supreme Court rendered an 
opinion which is invariably cited for the proposition that congres­
sional authorization of jurisdiction is not limited by state bounda­
ries. 2G In this case a resident of the northern district of 
Mississippi filed a suit for libel in the district court against a Dela­
ware corporation. The defendant had an office in the southern 
district of Mississippi and had consented to suit in Mississippi. 
The libel was published in the southern district. In the context of 
discussing a number of objections raised by the defendant, the 
Court considered the significance of its consent. It pointed out 
that such consent rendered the defendant "present" in the state 
and thus subject to service under the provision of rule 4 which 
authorized service throughout the state and not simply in the dis­
trict. In this context, the Court asserted that "Congress could 
provide for service of process anywhere in the United States."27 
Since Congress had this power, although it had not exercised it 
statutorily, the Court believed that it could effectuate such service 
through its rulemaking power.28 Thus the opinion both confirms 
the power of Congress to authorize personal jurisdiction without 
reference to state boundaries, and the Court's authority to exer­
cise such service through its rulemaking power.2!l 
23. Commitlee's Note, supra note 22. 
24. !d.; Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the TelTitorial Reach of Federal 
Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520, 535 (1963). 
25. Commitlee's Note, supra note 22 (citing Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946)). 
26. E.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1979): SPf 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, Supporting Memorandum B 437 (1969) [hereinaf­
ter ALI STUDY]' 
27. 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (citing Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 PeL) 
300, 328 (1838); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); 
Robertson, 268 U.S. at 622). 
28. Id. at 442-43. See supra note 9. 
29. 326 U.S. at 442-43; ALI STUDY, supra note 26, at 441; WRIGHT, supra 
note 14, § 1127. The opinion went on to make clear that it was permissible for 
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This analysis disposes of the concerns of the advisory com­
mittee concerning the bulge provision, and, in addition, serves as 
a basis for the principle that Congress has the power to authorize 
nationwide service of process. However, it avoids any direct com­
ment on the question of whether there are due process limitations 
on these authorizations of service of process. The reason for this 
may simply be that there is no real problem with due process in 
the "bulge" service situation. Murphree makes it clear that there is 
no legitimate basis for saying that a federal court's territorial 
reach is necessarily limited by state borderlines, and that Con­
gress has the power to authorize service of process across state 
lines. If this is so, then it can be argued that expanding a district 
by 100 miles from the courthouse, as the advisory committee sug­
gests, is not onerous or unreasonable and therefore not violative 
of personal due process rights. But to conclude that a slight in­
crease in the reach of federal jurisdiction beyond state borders is 
valid does not resolve the question whether (and to what extent) 
limitations can or should be placed on more expansive assertions 
of jurisdiction such as nationwide service of process. In consider­
ing this question it is necessary to examine how the courts have 
dealt with situations in which Congress has authorized jurisdic­
tion far beyond the limits of the 100 mile bulge. 
2. Congressional Authorization of Nationwide Service of Process 
Congress has exercised its power to provide for nationwide 
service of process in a number of areas.30 Typical examples of 
this type of legislation are the jurisdictional provisions of the 
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,31 the Federal Interpleader 
Act,32 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.33 An examina­
tion of the purposes of these provisions, and how the courts have 
the rules to be used to implement this federal power in the absence of explicit 
action by Congress. In the view of the court this neither violated FED. R. CIV. P. 
82 nor the Enabling Act. The court stated that rule 82 had to be construed with 
rule 4(f) since the advisory committee had drafted both. As such the court saw 
rule 82 as referring only to venue and subject matter jurisdiction. The Enabling 
Act was not violated since the court viewed the rules as only affecting the man­
ner and means of recovery, but not substantive rights. 326 U.S. at 445-46. 
30. For a listing .of statutes authorizing nationwide service of process, see 
MOORE, supra note II, ~~ 4.33 & 4.42[2.-1]; Berger, supra note 16, at 318-19 
n.157. 
31. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1982). 
32. !d. §§ 1335, 1397,2361. 
33. 15 U.S.c. §§ 78a-78KK (1982). 
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treated them, will be of assistance in formulating a general ap­
proach to nationwide service of process. 
a. Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 
Two major cases34 have fully considered situations in which 
jurisdiction was obtained by nationwide service of process under 
the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.35 The relevant section 
provides: 
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or 
employee of the United States or any agency thereof act­
ing in his official capacity or under color of legal author­
ity, or any agency of the United States, may, except as 
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial 
district in which: (1) a defendant in the action resides, or 
(2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property in­
volved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides 
ifno real property is involved in the action. 
The summons and complaint in such action shall be 
served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure except that the delivery of the summons and com­
plaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules 
may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial lim­
its of the district in which the action is brought.3G 
The section has been described as a "plaintiff's provision" 
34. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd all olher g1'Oullds sub 
110m., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382 
(D.R.I. 1977), aif'd ill pari and rev'd in pari, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rel"d all 
olher groullds sub 110m., Stafford v. Briggs. 444 U.S. 527 (1980). 
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1982). It appears that the nationwide ser­
vice of process provision set forth in this section is intended to confer personal 
jurisdiction and is not simply a method of service applicable to a defendant al­
ready amenable to suit. E.g., United States ex rei. Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F. 
Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). COlilm United States ex reI. Rudick v. Laird, 412 
F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1969), mi. dellied, 396 U.S. 918 (1969). Rudick would seem to be 
underqIt by the dictum in the later Second Circuit opinion of Liberation News 
Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1382 (2d Cir. 1970). 
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982). The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 
also added 28 U.S.C. § 1361 which enlarg'ed the subject matter jurisdiction of 
federal district courts by specifically authorizing mandamus actions to require 
government officials to perform their duties. By "historic (sic) accident" such 
proceedings had previously been limited to the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia. S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, rejJl'ililed ill 
1962 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2784, 2785; see Stafford y. Briggs, 44-1 
U.S. 527, 533-35 (1980); Byse & Fiocca, Serlioll 1361 of Ihe J/alld(l/IIUS alld 1 flllll' 
Acl of 1962 alld "Xollslalulory" jlldirial Review of Ff'deml Admillislmlil'e .1rlioll. 81 
HARv. L. REV. 308. 310-13 (1967). 
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which is intended to allow suits against supervisory federal offi­
cials or heads of agencies in places other than the District of Co­
lumbia, where they usually have their official residences. 37 It also 
is intended to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff wished or 
was required to sue two indispensable federal officers in her 
home state, but only one resided there. 38 It accomplishes these 
purposes by expanding the possible bases for proper venue and 
allowing service of process by certified mail beyond the territorial 
limits of the state in which the court is located.39 
In considering these provisions, Congress made only passing 
reference to the service of process provision.40 Its primary focus 
was to provide a local forum for resolution of such disputes. 41 
While it has been generally accepted that the section provides for 
nationwide service of process, it has been left to the courts to con­
sider whether there are any constitutional limits on this congres­
sional authorization. 
In Briggs v. Goodwin 42 the plaintiffs sued three federal prose­
cutors and an FBI agent who had allegedly violated their constitu­
tional rights during a grand jury investigation in the northern 
district of Florida. The suit was filed in the Federal District Court 
for the District of Columbia, which was the official residence of 
one of the defendants.43 The three Florida defendants were 
served by certified mail. These defendants moved for transfer to 
37. See, e.g., Powelton Civic Home Onwers Ass'n v. Department of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
38. See Jacoby, The Effeci of Recenl Changes in Ihe Law of "Nonslallllol)' "JlIdicial 
Review, 53 GEO. LJ. 19,41 (1964). 
39. Id.; MOORE, sllpra note II, ~ 4.29, at 4-242 to -245. Presumably the 
second federal officer, as an indispensable party, could be served under the 100 
mile bulge provision of rule 4(f), but this is of limited utility since frequently the 
absent federal officer is located in the District of Columbia. It should be noted 
that the "bulge" provision was adopted in 1963, so that it did not exist at the 
time of adoption of section 1391 (e). Of course, it would also be possible to use 
the state's long-arm statute, but in 1962 the general venue statute required that 
the suit be brought where all the defendants resided and not where the claim 
arose. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 388 (D.R.I. 1977), aif'd in part a/ld m,'d i/l 
pari, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd all olher gTollnds sllb /10111., Stafford v. 
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). 
40. H.R. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961). 
41. !d. at 2-3. 
42. 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd all olher graullds SIIb /10111., Stafford y. 
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). 
43. The District of Columbia defendant was served within the district and 
did not contest jurisdiction. Id. at 3 n.ll. Both the district court and court of 
appeals denied this defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of absolute 
prosccutorial immunity. Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974), 
aif'd, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), wi. dellied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978). 
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the northern district of Florida or, alternatively, for dismissal for 
improper venue and insufficiency of process. 
In reversing the district court's order of dismissal, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia began its analysis by 
pointing out that section 1391 (e) was controlling, and that it pro­
vided that the district where one of the defendants resided was a 
proper venue.44 The court then considered whether extraterrito­
rial service, as provided by the statute, presented any constitu­
tional problems. The defendants argued that service was 
improper because Congress did not intend nationwide service to 
apply in a personal action for money damages against federal offi­
cials. They argued alternatively that if it did apply, then such ser­
vice was constitutionally deficient.45 
The court quickly disposed of the first argument by relying 
on the categorical language of the section which did not provide 
for any exceptions.46 
The court next considered the constitutional sufficiency of 
the statute as applied. The defendants argued that it was uncon­
stitutional to require their appearance in the District of Columbia 
unless they had minimum contracts with that district. They 
pressed the analogy of fourteenth amendment due process limita­
tions on the assertion of state court jurisdiction and suggested 
. that similar limitations should apply in federal question cases. 
The court of appeals also rejected this argument. In its view, 
there was no basis for concluding that limitations placed on state 
courts applied as well to congressional authorization of jurisdic­
tion in federal courts. It felt that there was no magic to state 
boundaries since Congress could redraw the federal districts at 
anytime ignoring state lines-or even reducing the number of 
federal courts, to "one ... or a mere handful."47 Thus, it rea-
44. 569 F.2d at 3-7. The district court's opinion was an unreported memo­
randum decision which is set out in some detail by the coun of appeals. Id at 3 
n.15. The court of appeals questioned why the district court did not resenT on 
the question of transfer (which it denied) until it decided the motion to dismiss 
so that it would have had the option to transfer at that point. The coun found 
support for this in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463. 466-67 (1962). 569 
F.2d at 3 n.15. For a discussion of Goldlmor, see infra note 216. 
45. 569 F.2d at 4-7. 
46. The court held that section 1391 (e) was applicable to suits for money 
damages against federal officials in their individual capacity if the official in­
flicted the injury "under color of legal authority" as opposed to simply a per­
sonal act. Id. at 5 & n.43. The United States Supreme Coun ultimately reversed 
on this point. See infra note 59. 
47. 569 F.2d at 9 & n.72. The question has at least been raised as to 
whether there is any significance to the fact that Congress has. with rare excep-
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soned, since there is no special significance to the boundaries of 
districts, and since Congress could create a situation which would 
necessitate nationwide service of process, it must have the power 
to do so. As a result, it rejected the view of those courts which 
had determined federal jurisdiction to be subject to the same 
"fairness standard" as state court jurisdiction when service was 
made outside the federal judicial district.48 Implicit in this analy­
sis is the assumption that constitutional limitations on the asser­
tion of federal jurisdiction are foreclosed because the assertion of 
such jurisdiction is different than the assertion of jurisdiction by a 
state court. 
A similar problem was faced in Driver v. Helms,49 a class action 
brought in the Rhode Island Federal District Court against vari­
ous government officials who allegedly violated the plaintiffs' con­
stitutional rights by interfering with first class mail. Some of the 
defendants, who neither resided in nor had any contacts with 
Rhode Island, filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, insuf­
ficiency of process and lack of personal jurisdiction.50 
In a detailed opinion the district court denied the motions. It 
concluded that Congress had authorized the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction on a nationwide basis under the statute. The court 
reasoned that the defendants were all within the United States 
and since it was only asserting sovereignty, there was no extrater­
ritorial assertion of jurisdiction involved. This situation was 
tion, chosen not to have districts cross state lines. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. 
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1106 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
48. 569 F.2d at 9 & n.74. The court cited Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Co., 397 F.2d I, 3 (3d Cir. 1968) and Lone Star Package Car Co. v. 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954) as examples of 
courts applying a fairness test. It pointed out that Fraley relied on LOlle Star and 
the latter relied on United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 
818 (1948) which had considered a fairness analysis in dealing with a nonresi­
dent British corporation. The Brigg's court stated that an attempt to assert ju­
risdiction over a defendant not within the United States is a different matter 
from asserting jurisdiction over one within its borders. See illfra text accompany­
ing notes 87-89. 
49. 74 F.R.D. 382 (D.R.I. 1977), ajf'd in part alld rev'd ill part, 577 F.2d 147 
(1st Cir. 1978), rev'd Oil other gmullds sub 110111., Stafford v. Briggs. 444 U.S. 527 
(1980). Plaintiffs claimed violation of their rights under the first, fourth. fifth 
and ninth amendments to the United States Constitution, and sought damages 
and declaratory and injunctive relief. Subject matter jurisdiction was based on 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1339, 1343, 1361 (1982) and 5 U.S.C. § 702. 74 F.R.D. at 
387. 
50. The district court set up a procedure to deal with the preliminary mo­
tions and limited its opinion to the motions referred to in the text as well as 
plaintiffs' motion to certify the class and a motion to dismiss defendant Clarence 
Kelly, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 74 F.R.D. at 387. 
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therefore distinct from that in which a state attempted to assert 
jurisdiction over a party beyond its borders, or the United States 
attempted to assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. As long 
as the defendant is within the sovereign's territorial limits, all that 
due process required was adequate notice. 51 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit undertook consideration of the question of personal juris­
diction. 52 Appellants argued that section 1391(e) only dealt with 
venue, not personal jurisdiction. They further argued that, if sec­
tion 1391(e) did authorize the assertion of personal jurisdiction, it 
was unconstitutional to the extent that it applied to individuals 
lacking minimum contacts with the state in which the court was 
located. The court of appeals first concluded that section 1391 (e) 
was a jurisdictional provision.53 It then considered the question 
of constitutional impediments to such an assertion of jurisdiction. 
The argument that minimum contacts were necessary to le­
gitimize jurisdiction was rejected. Concurring with the district 
court's view, the court of appeals concluded that contacts analysis 
was only relevant when state courts were involved because a 
state's sovereignty was circumscribed by its boundaries. But such 
boundaries were irrelevant to federal assertions of jurisdiction be­
cause the federal government's sovereignty is only limited by na­
tional borders.54 Using language similar to that of the Briggs 
court, the First Circuit pointed out that Congress could draw its 
judicial districts anyway it wished, and therefore, federal court ju­
risdiction was not limited by state boundaries."" 
In response to appellant's argument regarding unfairness 
and due process violations, the court indicated that federal offi­
cials have to accept this possibility of being sued in distant forums 
51. !d. at 391 n.6. 
52. 577 F.2d at 154-57. The First Circuit, however, first disposed of a 
number of preliminary issues. The court concluded that section I :~!) I (e) did not 
apply to former government officials, but only to current gO\TnJment o/licials. 
It also held that the section permitted personal damage actions. frl. at 1-l!1-5-l. 
This latter point was the basis for reversal by the United States Suprcmc Coun. 
See il/fra note 59. 
53. The court pointed out that while the section was labeled "\·('nue." the 
language therein clearly allowed service bv mail bevolld the territorial limits of 
the state as an exception to the g'eneral provisions (1I' service prO\'ided in rule 
4(l). The court also pointed out the legislative histor\' which supported the vie\\' 
of the section as a jurisdictional provision. 577 F.2d at 155-56. For a furthl'1' 
discussion SPP SIIpm note 35. 
54. 577 F.2d at 156 n.25. 
55. Id. at 156-57. 
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given the broad range of people affected by their official acts.5O 
In addition, the court felt that the district court's ability to trans­
fer actions protected the defendants against any excessive bur­
den.',7 The court felt that proper notice, reasonably calculated to 
inform the defendant of the pendency of the action, was the only 
due process limitation on Congress. The court found this re­
quirement satisfied. 5H 
The United States Supreme Court reversed Briggs and Driver 
on the grounds that section 1391 (e) did not apply to actions for 
money damages, and, therefore, the actions brought were not 
proper under the statute.59 By basing its decision on a limiting 
statutory construction, the majority avoided the need to discuss 
the question of nationwide service of process. Justice Stewart dis­
senting, joined by Justice Brennan, made the only comment rele­
vant to the jurisdictional question. He rejected the defendants' 
contacts argument saying: 
The short answer to this argument is that due pro­
cess requires only certain minimum contacts between the 
defendant and the sovereign that has created the court. 
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186; International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310. The issue is not whether it 
is unfair to require a defendant to assume the burden of 
litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather whether 
the court of a particular sovereign has power to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a named defendant. The cases 
before us involved suits against residents of the United 
States in the courts of the United States. No due process 
problem exists. (iO 
It is interesting to note that while the lower courts and Justice 
Stewart are emphatic in stating that the presence of the defendant 
'within the sovereign's borders ends all due process considera-
56. IrI. at 157. Bill .1('1' Stafford Y. Briggs. 444 U.S. 527. 544-45 (1980). For a 
discussion of Siafford. sec illfra note 208. 
57. Srp 28 U .S.C. * 1404(a) (1982) (providing for transfer of actions). 
58. In support of this the court cited Mariash \'. Morrill. 4% F.2d II ;~8. 
1143 (2d Cir. 1974). 'rhe court concluded that certified mail met this test. 5i7 
F.2d at 157. 
5!1. 444 C.S. 527. 540-45. 
GO. fd. at 554 (Stewart . .J.. dissenting): ([((Ord Leroy \'. Creat \\". United 
Corp .. 44:~ u.s. 173. 192 (White . .J .. dissenting) (simply states conclusion that 
there arc "no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the exercise of juris­
diction by the United States over its residents") (citing' Fitzsimmons Y. Barton. 
5H!) F.2d 3,W (7th Cir. I!J79)). 
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tions, except as to notice, they do not state any compelling rea­
sons for this conclusion. It is arguable that due process 
limitations on service of process should be concerned with factors 
relating to fairness which go beyond sovereign power. 61 If this is 
so, nationwide service of process would necessarily be subject to 
greater restrictions than simply fair notice. 
b. The Federal Interpleader Act 
The Federal Interpleader Act was originally passed by Con­
gress to deal with situations in which insurance companies were 
faced with multiple claims to the proceeds of a policy and the 
claimants were located in different jurisdictions.62 Since there 
was no single jurisdiction which could obtain personal jurisdic­
tion over all the necessary parties, it was impossible for the com­
panies to use common-law interpleader procedure to avoid 
potential multiple liability.63 Congress solved this problem by al­
lowing nationwide service of process in these cases.G4 
In interpleader cases reaching the Supreme Court, the issue 
of the constitutional power to exercise such nationwide service 
has not yet been addressed. Thus, possible fifth amendment due 
61. See illfra text accompanying notes 107-58. 
62. 3A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 
22.06 (2d ed. 1987). This statutory interpleader is distinct from interpleader 
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 22 which provides for interpleader under state law 
without the restrictions of the statute, but also without the benefits of nation­
wide service of process. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 V.S. 
523,528 n.3 (1967); MOORE, supra, ~~ 22.13 at 22-120, 22.04[2.-2] at 22-33. 
63. When all the claimants live in a single jurisdiction so that personaljuris­
diction could be obtained over them, interpleader permits the so-called stake­
holder to sue them all in either state or federal court. The stakeholder mav then 
deposit the funds in court and all the claimants are enjoined from suing the 
stakeholder. The claimants then litigate amongst themselves the question of en­
titlement to the fund. See gellerally Hazard & Moskovitz, .-111 Hisloriml alld Criliral 
Allal,\·sis of Illlelpleader, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 706 (1964). The Supreme Court de­
cided shortly before the adoption of the statute that ill /'fill and quasi ill /'f'I1/ juris­
diction could not be used to bind nonresidents in interpleader. New York Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Sfe gfllerally Seeburger. The Frdemll.ollg­
Arm: The Cses of Divmily. or Taill'l So. J/rGee. 10 IND. L. RE\'. 480. 495-500 
(1977). 
64. The statutory requirements for nationwide service of process are 
(I) that there be $500 at stake, (2) that at least two of the advel'se claimants be of 
diverse citizenship, and (3) that the plaintiff deposit the fund with the coun 
clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). In addition. the action must be brought in a 
judicial district where at least one of the c1aimal1ls resides. 28 U .S.c. § 1397. If 
these requirements are met then process may be sen'ed in any judicial district 
where a claimant resides, withoUl limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2361. Whether pro­
cess could be served on nonresidents of the United States has been left open by 
the Supreme Court. State Farm Fire & Casualty CO. Y. Tashire. 386 ll.S. 523. 
537 n.18 (1967). 
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process limitations on its use are still an open question.6 !} As indi­
cated in the earlier discussion, it seems clear that Congress has 
the power to authorize this broad jurisdictional scope, so the fact 
that this question of power has not been raised in the context of 
interpleader is not surprising.66 But the absence of any real dis­
cussion of the due process question does not negate the existence 
of due process concerns. There has been no conclusive statement 
on this question. It can be argued, therefore, as Justice Stewart 
suggested in his dissent in Briggs,67 that as long as the defendants 
have minimum contacts with the United States there is no due 
process problem in as much as the "particular sovereign" has 
power over them. However, one might also argue that due pro­
cess requires a reasonably convenient forum when the multi state 
nature of the underlying controversy necessitates appearance in a 
forum with little, if any, connection with certain defendants. At a 
minimum, such an argument plays off due process interests 
against interests in the economy and consistency in the resolution 
of controversies.ml As indicated above,m) the purpose of the In­
terpleader Act was to deal with situations in which no one court 
could otherwise obtain jurisdiction over all of the parties. In th,e 
absence of a statute, a stakeholder would be faced with the possi­
bility of multiple lawsuits and the consequent substantial risk of 
inconsistent results. In such cases resolution of the problem ne­
cessitates that some claimants must be subjected to jurisdiction in 
a district in which they would not normally have to appear. But 
since this is a special type of case and since at least one claimant 
must reside in the district where the suit is filed, there is an essen­
tial pragmatic fairness which appears to justify the assertion .of 
jurisdiction. Such an analysis would allow for the continued use 
of nationwide service of process in interpleader, while establish-
65. The interpleader cases reaching the Court were State Farm Fire & Cas­
ualty Co. v. Tashire. 386 U.S. 523 (1967); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining' Co .. 308 
U.S. 66 (1939); Worcester County Trust CO. Y. Rilev. 302 U.S. 292 (1937); Du­
gas v, American Sur. Co .. 300 U.S. 414 (1937); Sanders Y. Armour Fertilizer 
Works. 292 U.S. 190 (1934); Levinson Y. United States. 258 U.S. 198 (1922). 
'rhe question of nationwide service of process was alluded to. but not discussed. 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tashil'l'. 
Tashire v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co .. 363 F.2d 7. 10 (9th Cir. 19(Hi). I'l'l'd. 
386 U.S. 523 (1967); .Iff' gfllemlly Seeburger. sllpm note G:~. at 484-85 & 493-502. 
(i(i. ALI STUDY . .III/no note 26. 
(i7, SI'P JII/))'{/ text accompanying note 60. 
G8. Sf'P Foster. slipm note 7. at 30-31; Hazard. 111/1'1:1/0 Ii' 1'1'11111'. 74 N\\,. U.L. 
REV, 71 I. 717-18 (1979); Traynor. Is This COllflir/ H('{IlIy Xm.I.I(I/:l'? 3 7 TEX. L. 
R~:\'. (i57. ()G3 (1950). 
G!J. Sf'P ,II/pm notes G2-63. 
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ing a more flexible test for consideration of this question in other 
contexts.70 
c. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The Securities Exchange Act of 193471 was adopted by Con­
gress in response to demands for regulation of the abuses in the 
securities market. 7'2 Section 27 of the Act73 provides for exclusive 
subject matter jurisdiction in federal district courts for suits under 
the Act. The section then goes on to provide, in relevant part: 
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created 
by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to 
enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and regula­
tions, may be brought in any such district or in the dis­
trict wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant 
or transacts business, and process in such cases may be 
served in any other district of which the defendant is an 
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. 74 
The meaning of this language as a basis for nationwide ser­
vice of process has been considered numerous times. 7 !> The 
courts have generally agreed that this section provides for nation­
wide service, and that Congress can authorize such assertions of 
jurisdiction.76 Having reached these conclusions, courts have 
gone on to consider the due process implications of such asser­
tions of jurisdiction. 
In Mariash v. Morrill,77 the plaintiff filed suit in the Southern 
District of New York against a number of Massachusetts defend­
ants who were involved in selling shares in Viatron Corporation 
70. See infra text accompanying notes 193-98. 
71. 15 V.S.C. § § 78a-78KK (1982). 
72. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 784-85 (2d cd. 1961). The act at­
tempts to regulate these excesses in four ways. "Every non-exempt security 
listed on an exchange must be registered by its issuer. Periodic reports mllst be 
filed thereafter. The solicitation of proxies must comply with the Commission's 
rules. And there are certain controls over insider-trading practices." Id. at 785. 
For a brief introduction to the Act and its amendments see R. JENNINGS & H. 
MARSH, SEClIRITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 441-48 (5th cd. 1982). 
73. 15 V.S.c. § 78aa (1982). 
74. Id. 
75. E.g., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), 
art. dmil'd, 417 V.S. 932 (1974); S-G Sec., Inc. \'. Fuqua II1\'. Co., 466 F. Supp. 
1114 (D. Mass. 1978); Garner v. Enright, 71 F.R.D. 656 (E.n.N.Y. 197(i). SI'I' 
il/fm note 83. 
7n . .'IeI' cases cited sujJm note 75. 
77. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). 










18 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33: p. 1 
as part of a private placement exempt from registration under the 
Securities Act of 1933.713 The complaint alleged that the defend­
ants had conspired to favor one of the defendants over the plain­
tiff in the delivery of an opinion letter, thus making it impossible 
for the plaintiff to sell his shares. 79 This was alleged to be a viola­
tion of section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341>0 and 
therefore nationwide service of process was authorized under sec­
tion 27. Among the defendants were eleven members of the law 
firm who had been Viatron's Boston attorneys.81 
These eleven defendants moved to dismiss on a variety of 
grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. The district 
court rejected the plaintiff's view that section 27 was a basis for 
personal jurisdiction, viewing it only as a provision governing 
subject matter jurisdiction and venue.82 The district court also 
concluded that personal jurisdiction had not been established 
under the New York long-arm statute and so dismissed the action 
as to that group. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec­
ond Circuit began by pointing out that section 27 did provide for 
nationwide service of process whenever a claim is stated under 
the Act.R3 The court then went on to consider whether there was 
any limit to this assertion of jurisdiction. In its view the assertion 
of nationwide service was limited by the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment.84 But it concluded that all that due process re­
quired was notice reasonably calculated to inform the defendants 
78. Section 77e requires the registration of any security sold in interstate 
commerce and section 77d(2) exempts transactions which do not involve a pub­
lic offer. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77d(2) (1982). 
79. Plaintiff needed the opinion letter in order to release his shares from 
the restrictions of the private placement. It was alleged that this was delayed so 
that defendant Burwick could put his substantial holdings in Viatron on the mar­
ket first. When the plaintiff finally attempted to sell the shares he was informed 
that the presence of these other shares on the market would make it difhcult to 
sell the plaintiff's shares. 496 F.2d at 1141. 
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). 
81. Originally twelve members of the firm were sued. but the dismissal of 
one was stipulated by the parties. 496 F.2d at 114\. 1142 n.5. 
82. This was an unreported opinion which Judge Kaufman onl\" alludes to 
in his own opinion. Jd. at 1140. 
83. Id. at 1142-43. The court indicated that it did not need to consider 
whether there was personal jurisdiction under New York law because section 27 
authorized nationwide service of process. In the court's view it was simply "too 
late in the day" to argue otherwise and found support for this ,·ie'.\" in Interna­
tional Controls Corp. v. Vesco. 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1(74) and Leasco Data 
Processing E.quipment Corp. v. Maxwell. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1(72). Jd. 
84. 496 F.2d at 1143. See slipra note 20. 
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of the action so that they would have an opportunity to be 
heard.85 Since there was no dispute over the notice given to the 
defendants, the court concluded that due process had been 
satisfied. 
In response to the defendants' argument that due process 
also required "minimal contacts" with the state where the district 
court sat, the court said that such a test was irrelevant to an asser­
tion of jurisdiction by the United States. It stated: 
It is not the State of New York but the United States 
"which would exercise its jurisdiction over them [the de­
fendants]." And plainly, where, as here, the defendants 
reside within the territorial boundaries of the United 
States, the "minimal contacts," required to justify the 
federal government's exercise of power over them, are 
present. Indeed, the "minimal contacts" principle does 
not, in our view, seem particularly relevant in evaluating 
the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction based 
on nationwide, but not extraterritorial, service of pro­
cess. It is only the latter, quite simply, which even raises 
a question of the forum's power to assert control over 
the defendant.86 
In so reasoning, the court sought to clarify an earlier Second 
Circuit opinion, Leaseo Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell. 87 
In that case, also a section 10(b) action, personal jurisdiction was 
also based on section 27. The court used a minimum contacts 
analysis to decide whether due process had been satisfied. The 
iV/anash court explained that this was not because such an analysis 
was necessary in all actions under section 27, but rather because 
the foreign defendants were not "present" within the United 
States.HH As such the question was one of extraterritorial service 
beyond the borders of the United States. Therefore, the Leaseo 
court felt it necessary to determine whether the foreign defend­
ants had sufficient connection with the United States to warrant 
an assertion of jurisdiction. H!J 
85. 496 F.2d at 1143. In support of this proposition the court simply cited. 
without explanation. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235. 245 (1958); \"'alker \'. 
City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane \'. Central HanO\'er Bank & 
Trust Co .• 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
86. 496 F.2d at 1143 (emphasis supplied by the court) (footnotes omilled). 
87. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir 1972). 
88. 496 F.2d at 1143 n.9. 
89. 468 F.2d at 1340; (laoI'd III I'P FOLOchromc, Inc.. 377 F. Supp. 26. 29 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), af['d. 517 F.2d 512 (1975). 
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A similar view on this issue was taken by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Fitzsimmons v. Barton.9o 
The court of appeals reviewed a dismissal by the district court of a 
nonresident defendant in a securities fraud action under the Se­
curities Exchange Act of 1934 on the grounds that he lacked suffi­
cient contacts with Illinois to satisfy its long-arm statute.91 The 
court of appeals began by pointing out that section 27 provided 
for nationwide service, and therefore the Illinois statute did not 
have to be consideredY2 Having reached this conclusion, the 
court considered whether there were any restraints placed on this 
service by the due process clause. The court concluded that 
under the reasoning of Shaffer v. Heitner 93 and International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington 94 a "fairness" standard was to be applied in review­
ing all assertions of jurisdiction. However, it went on to say that 
this "fairness" related to the "exercise of power by a particular 
sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigating 
in a distant forum. "95 Based on this test the court felt that the 
assertion of jurisdiction was fair since the defendant was a resi­
dent of the United States and therefore had sufficient contacts 
with the "particular sovereign" seeking to exercise power over 
himYI; In rejecting the idea that fairness, for jurisdictional pur-
90. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). 
91. !d. at 332. The district court decision was unreported. 
92. The court stated that rule 4(e) authorizes the use of the law of the state 
in which the district court sits when no United States statute provides for man­
ner of service. Since Congress had authorized service, then under rule 4(e) that 
is sufficient, and no reference to state law was necessary. 589 F.2d at 332. Ifan 
action is brought pursuant to a federal statute which does not provide for service 
of process then it would be necessary to resort to a special provision such as rule 
4(f) or to the law of the state in which the district court sits to accomplish service 
outside that state's borders. E.g. Volk Corp. v. Art-Pak Clip Art Serv .. 432 F. 
Supp.1179, 1181 &n.2(S.D.N.Y.1977). Forafurtherdiscussion,seesllpmnote 
17. 
93. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
94. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
95. 589 F.2d at 333. The court recognized that both Shajffr and llltp/'llatiolla/ 
Shoe were cases dealing with state court jurisdiction, but felt that the broad artic­
ulation of a fairness standard should be applied to all such assertions. ld. at 332. 
96. The court found additional support for its method of analysis in the 
older cases approving of Congress' power to require a defendant to appear in 
any court of the United States when she has been served within its borders. It 
cited .1JllIphrpl', 326 U.S .438 (1946); Robertsoll 268 U.S. 619 (1925): United States 
v. Union Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878); and it also cited .1Jaria.lh, 496 F.2d 
1138 as supportive in the context of section 27. ld. at 333-34. Similarh', the 
Ninth Circuit has held that minimum contacts with the United States is all that is 
required under section 27 of the Securities Act of 1934. Securities IIwestor Pro­
tection Corp. v. Vigman, 7()4 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985). There the court con­
cluded defendants who were residents of the United States had sullicient 
minimum contacts to be subject to personal jurisdiction in any federal dislI'ict 










1988] NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS 21 
poses, also related to the imposition of the burden of litigating in 
a particular forum, it said that such concerns could be dealt with 
in the context of deciding questions of change of venueY7 
In so ruling, the court disapproved of the "fairness" test re­
lating to the burden of litigating in a particular forum which had 
been set out in Oxford First C01P. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.9H by a 
district court in denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdic­
tion under section 27. The Fitzsimmons court viewed such a "fair­
ness" test as irrelevant to the question of a particular sovereign 
exercising power; rather it viewed fairness as pertinent to ques­
tions of the convenience of the forum for purposes of venueY!) It 
stated that these factors were relevant to the "non-jurisdictional 
doctrine offorum non conveniens," and that they were therefore in­
appropriate to determine the constitutionality of personal 
jurisdiction. 100 
The cases which have considered the question of nationwide 
service under section 27 have recognized that the fifth amend­
ment does place limitations on Congress' power to authorize na-
court, but remanded the question of whether a defendant who was not a resident 
of the United States has sufficient contacts with the United States to make it 
reasonably foreseeable that it would be subjected to suit in the United States. Id. 
at 1316. 
97. The court viewed these questions as relating to the issue of fOI"//I1/ 11011 
convelliells in considering motions for change of venue pursuant to 28 U .S.C. 
§ 1404(a). Id. at 334. 
98. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974). That court set out five factors as 
relevant to its fairness analysis. Id. at 203-04. For a further discussion, see infra 
text accompanying notes 190-92. 
99. 589 F.2d at 334 n.5. 
100. Id. at 334 & n.5. In that footnote, the court criticized the Oxford Firsl 
court for not simply applying its factors to the concept off 01'11111 nOli cO/lvenims. It 
then stated: 
Oxford First considered this argument and rejected it on the ground that 
it avoids the issue of constitutional restrictions. 372 F. Supp. at 203 
n.24. However, if these factors are of constitutional significance, an is­
sue that we do not decide, we do not understand why they would be any 
less so because applied under the rubric of fOl'uIII /lOll collvenii'lls instead 
of personal jurisdiction. 
Id. at 334 n.5. This statement by the court seems to misperceive the problem 
before it. It assumes that concepts of fairness are irrelevant to personal jurisdic­
tion because they have always been considered under the doctrine of fO/'ll1l/ /1011 
conveniens. Such a sharp distinction between these concepts does not appear jus­
tified for the reasons indicated in the next section of this article. See illfra text 
accompanying notes 161-73. In addition, to avoid the question of the constitu­
tional significance of a fairness concept, under whatever rubric, is to beg the 
question. As long as such factors do not have constitutional significance. courts 
will continue to exercise broad discretion in deciding to hold, transfer or dismiss 
a case with only limited appellate review. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. 330 U.S. 
501,508 (1947). 
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tionwide service of process. While a due process standard of 
fairness has been suggested by some courts,IOI the trend in au­
thority seems to be that due process only requires adequate no­
tice. In turn this principle is based on the fact that the minimum 
contacts test developed in cases such as International Shoe, 102 Han­
son v. Denckla 103 and Shaffer v. Heitner 104 is relevant only in deter­
mining whether a particular sovereign can assert jurisdiction. 
Thus, in considering state court jurisdiction, the question is rele­
vant in determining the constitutionality of such assertions be­
yond state borders. In cases based on nationwide service of 
process, it would be relevant only in cases involving defendants 
101. E.g., Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 
(E.D. Pa. 1974). A number of other courts have suggested this. For example, in 
United States ex rei. Armstrong v. Wheeler, 321 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1970), the 
court concluded that section 1391 (e) authorized the assertion of personal juris­
diction in a habeas corpus proceeding for discharge from the army. But it went 
on to say that it was still necessary to determine if the defendant had "sufficient 
contacts with this district such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play." /d. at 478. A federal district court sitting in 
Iowa came to the conclusion that a defendant had to have sufficient contacts with 
Iowa to comport with due process even where jurisdiction was based on section 
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 
F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Iowa, C.D. 1973). However that court reached its result be­
cause it felt bound by Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 
1973), which came to that conclusion in a section 27 suit against a Canadian 
corporation not present in the United States. As we have already seen the asser­
tion of jurisdiction over defendants who are either not citizens of, or are not 
found in, the United States has received different treatment. A fairness test was 
also considered in general terms by the court, in Dijulio v. Digicon, Inc., 325 F. 
Supp. 963 (D. Md. 1971), in an action where jurisdiction was asserted both 
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Dijl/­
lio was disagreed with by the court, in Stern v. GobeiofF, 332 F. Supp. 909 (D. 
Md. 1971), but the court added that even if Dijl/fio was correct the defendant in 
Stem had sufficient contacts with the district for a suit under the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Finally, in Kipperman v. Mc­
Cone, 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976), which was a class action under section 
1391 (e) seeking relief for the CIA's opening of mail intended for the Soviet 
Union, the court stated that section 1391 (e) provided a mechanism for effective 
service but it was still necessary to decide if the assertion of jurisdiction com­
ported with due process. In support of this it cited, illteralia, United States ex rei. 
Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 918 (1969). 
Having stated this, the court seems to have decided SI/b silelltio that it was obliged 
to determine whether jurisdiction could be asserted under the California long­
arm statute and minimum contacts. 422 F. Supp. at 871. 
It should be noted that subsequent to the decisions in Wheeler and Rudick the 
United States Supreme Court decided that section 1391 (e) did not extend juris­
diction in habeas corpus cases. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 
(1971). It is necessary that the "custodian" defendant be present or have con­
tacts with the district in which suit is brought. Id. at 490-91; Strait v. Laird, 406 
U.S. 341, 345 n.2 (1972). 
102. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
103. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
104. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
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located outside the United States. But when defendants reside 
within the United States the necessity of requiring more than ade­
quate notice does not exist. I05 
In reaching this conclusion, these courts seemed to have fo­
cused exclusively on the power aspect of jurisdiction, while failing 
to consider how concepts of territorial sovereignty have been sup­
plemented by principles of fairness and convenience in the state 
court personal jurisdiction area. I06 This latter movement sug­
gests that the concept of due process is broad enough to encom­
pass a fairness analysis even where sovereign power exists. The 
next section will consider why such an analysis is appropriate in 
the area of nationwide service of process. Once this proposition 
is established consideration will be given to the factors relevant to 
deciding the fairness of assertions of jurisdiction in this area. 
III. A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS 
The difficulty with the "power focused" analysis in this area 
is that concepts of fairness are invariably equated with power over 
the defendant in considering the due process ramifications of ex­
traterritorial service of process. 107 Once it is determined that the 
defendant is within the sovereign'S power, courts have assumed 
that there is no due process limitation on requiring such a de­
fendant to appear in a particular court. 108 This is a most grudg­
ing application of the concept of due process in the area of 
personal jurisdiction. The justification for this ungenerous appli­
cation of due process is found in the assumption that a "minimum 
contacts" approach to jurisdictional questions is only relevant to 
the power of sovereign states to act beyond their borders.loD 
However, the Supreme Court has frequently emphasized that 
the due process limitations on state court jurisdiction are in­
tended to function not solely as limitations on sovereign power, 
105. E.g., 111ariash, 496 F.2d at 1143 nn.8 & 9. 
106. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286 
(1980); Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143,545 P.2d 264,127 Cal. Rptr. 352 
(1976); see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 47, at 1106. For a further discussion, 
see infra text accompanying notes 110-39. 
107. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell. 468 F.2d 1326, 
1340 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that although Exchange Act authorized service of 
process anywhere, it did not do so beyond bounds of due process which in this 
case meant fair notice of suit). 
108. E.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart.]., dissent­
ing). For a discussion of this point in the context of the Mandamus and Venue 
Act of 1962, see supra text accompanying notes 45-61. 
109. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart,]., dissenting). 
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but also to ensure that the defendant receives the protection of a 
fair forum. 
A. State Court jurisdiction Cases 
In order to understand the nature of these dual functions, it 
will be helpful to briefly review the development of these con­
cepts in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Beginning with Pennoyer 
v. Nelfi 10 the Supreme Court established that assertions of juris­
diction were to be limited by the due process clause and that in 
order to establish jurisdiction a tribunal must be able to assert 
physical power within the territorial limits of the state. II I This 
standard remained the hallmark of jurisdictional limitations for 
the next sixty-eight years. In this period, however, many situa­
tions arose in which a strict "power" principle did not provide a 
satisfactory resolution of jurisdictional questions, especially in a 
society increasingly confronted with conflicts between parties 
from different states. 112 It was during this period that the Court 
developed a number of fictions to justify the assertion of jurisdic­
tion within the framework of a "power" analysis. I 13 
Finally, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 114 the Court at­
tempted to revamp its analysis to deal with this situation. In that 
case the question was whether the defendant, a Delaware corpo­
ration based in Missouri, was amenable to suit in the State of 
110. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For an analysis of the period prior to Pennoyer, see 
Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Persollallljurisdictioll of 
State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569,569-
70 (1958); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
241, 252-62 (P. Kurland ed.). . 
III. 95 U.S. at 720-22; Clermont, Restating Territon'al jurisdiction and Venue 
for State and Fedeml Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 414-15 (1981). Technically, 
the holding in PemlOyer was that the state court judgment was to be denied full 
faith and credit, but its dicta clearly established the due process clause as con­
trolling in this area, though it was not applicable to the case before the Court. 
Kurland, supm note liD, at 572. 
112. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957). 
113. Thus, for example, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Court 
upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist who had been 
involved in an automobile accident in the forum state by the fiction that he had 
consented by his actions to the appointment of an agent within the jurisdiction 
for service of process, thus making him present and subject to the power of the 
tribunal. See also Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 US. 623 (1935). The 
Supreme Court ultimately recognized the fictive nature of "consent," Olberding 
v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953), as well as other fictions based 
on "presence." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 
(1945). An excellent summary of this period in the development of a due pro­
cess analysis by the Court may be found in Kurland, supm note 110, at 573-86. 
114. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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Washington to collect payments owed to Washington's unem­
ployment compensation fund. The Court, speaking through 
Chief Justice Stone, began by rejecting the need for physical pres­
ence in the state as the sole means of asserting jurisdiction: 
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judg­
ment in personam is grounded on their de facto power 
over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within 
the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to 
its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pen­
noyer v. Neff . ... But now that the capias ad respondendum 
has given way to personal service of summons or other 
form of notice, due process requires only that in order to 
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be 
not present within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte­
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice."115 
While the Court suggested a new basis for personal jurisdiction in 
terms of the now familiar concept of "minimum contacts" and 
"fair play and substantial justice," the opinion created difficulties 
because this new standard was abstract, amorphous and difficult 
to define in the concrete instance. I 16 At some points the Court 
focused on "minimum contacts" indicating that a key question 
was the defendant's activities in the forum and how they related 
to the cause of action. 117 At other times, it spoke in broad 
terms about reasonableness I 18 and "'estimate[s] of the 
inconveniences.' "119 
As a result, it was unclear what precise test was to be used by 
courts in resolving jurisdictional questions. However, it was clear 
115. Id. at 316 (citation omitted). 
116. The amorphous nature of the majority's standard led Justice Black to 
file a separate opinion decrying the use of "elastic standards" such as "fair 
play," "justice" and "reasonableness" which might unduly limit the power of 
states to assert jurisdiction. Id. at 325; Kurland, supra note 110, at 590. 
117. 326 U.S. at 317-19; Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to All/bivalence in 
Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 61,64 (1977); Clermont, supra note Ill, at 
415-16; Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Penn oyer, McGee v. Interna­
tional Life Insurance Co. andJun·sdiction Over Individuals, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 
285,287-88 (1958). 
118. 326 u.S. at 320. 
119. /d. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 
141 (2d Cir. 1930)). As Professor Kurland has suggested, Intemational Shoe may 
have "served rather to destroy existent doctrine than to establish new criteria for 
the Supreme Court and other courts to follow." Kurland, supra note 110, at 586. 
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that "fairness" was to be a term in the equation. In the next sev­
eral years the Court decided a number of cases which appeared to 
increase the emphasis on "fairness" in deciding jurisdictional 
questions. In particular, this was suggested by the Supreme 
Court's opinion in McGee v. International Life Insurance CO.120 In 
McGee, a California resident sought to assert jurisdiction in Cali­
fornia over a Texas insurance company for recovery on an insur­
ance policy issued by the defendant to her son. The only contacts 
the defendant had with California were an agreement, sent by 
mail, to insure the defendant and the acceptance of premium pay­
ments, mailed from California by the defendant. 121 In concluding 
that, consistent with due process, California could assert jurisdic­
tion over the defendant, the Court focused its analysis on balanc­
ing the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the state to 
decide whether the assertion of jurisdiction was reasonable. As 
the Court stated: 
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest inter­
est in providing effective means of redress for its resi­
dents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These 
residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were 
120. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In the period between International Shoe and Mc­
Gee the Court decided three cases which were consistent with the development 
of a concern for fairness. In Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 
643 (1950), Justice Black, speaking for four justices concluded in an opinion, in 
which Justice Douglas concurred, that the defendant was subject to jurisdiction 
to regulate its advertising and sale of insurance to citizens of Virginia. In the 
course of the opinion Justice Black, in dicta, suggested that factors such as con­
venience of the plaintiff and the state's interest in asserting jurisdiction were 
relevant to its analysis. Id. at 648-49. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Court approved the assertion of jurisdiction 
of New York over all claimants to common trust funds located in New York 
based on the need of the state to administer and close these trusts without focus­
ing on defendants' activities. Id. at 312-13. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated 
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Court said it would be consistent with due 
process for Ohio to assert jurisdiction over a corporation created under the laws 
of the Philippines, which operated in Ohio during the Japanese occupation of 
the Philippines, for an action relating to events occurring outside of Ohio. The 
opinion states that continuous business activity in the state is enough for due 
process. Id. at 445-46. 
121. 355 U.S. at 221-22. Upon the insured's death, and the defendant's 
refusal to pay on the policy, his mother sued in California state court to recover 
under the policy. California based jurisdiction on its statute which subjected 
foreign corporations to suits based on insurance contracts with residents. Judg­
ment was obtained in California. When it could not be collected there, the 
plaintiff sought to enforce it in Texas, which was the defendant's principal place 
of business. Texas refused to enforce the judgment stating it was void under the 
fourteenth amendment. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579 
(Tex. Civ. App., 1956). 
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forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State 
in order to hold it legally accountable. When claims 
were small or moderate individual claimants frequently 
could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a for­
eign forum-thus in effect making the company judg­
ment proof. Often the crucial witnesses-as here on the 
company's defense of suicide-will be found in the in­
sured's locality. Of course there may be inconvenience 
to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California 
where it had this contract but certainly nothing which 
amounts to a denial of due process. 122 
27 
To the extent that this language suggests that questions of 
jurisdiction are to be resolved by balancing all interests to deter­
mine a fair forum,123 it was undercut a year later by the Court's 
decision in Hanson v. Denckla. 124 The Court in Hanson ruled that 
Florida could not assert jurisdiction over a Delaware trust com­
pany in a suit involving the validity of a power of appointment 
under a trust. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority in a 
5-4 decision, made it clear that territorial power was still a key 
issue in any due process analysis: 
[T]he requirements for personal jurisdiction over non­
residents have evolved from the rigid rule of Penn oyer v. 
Neff . .. to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington . ... Those restrictions are more than a guar­
antee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litiga­
tion. They are a consequence of territorial limitations 
on the power of respective States. However minimal the 
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant 
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 
"minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite 
to its exercise of power over him.125 
122. 355 U.S. at 223-24. 
123. In summarizing this period, Professor Kurland has said: 
From International Shoe to International Life, the Supreme Court had 
evolved a doctrine of non-interference with the exercise of jurisdiction 
over nonresident defendants by state courts. By lise of the "fairness" 
test, suggested by Mr. Chief Justice Stone in derivation from Judge 
Learned Hand, the Court had made the question of the propriety of 
such personal jurisdiction a matter of fact which, for all practical pur­
poses, was not reviewable in the Supreme Court. 
Kurland, supra note 110, at 610. 
124. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
125. Id. at 251. The Court not only emphasized the importance of power, 
but also appeared to resurrect the importance of categorization of actions as ill 
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While the opinion has been criticized by commentators as a retro­
gressive approach to jurisdiction based on unclear reasoning, 126 it 
is at least fair to say that, as the language quoted above suggests, 
the opinion does not reject the significance of a "fairness" analy­
sis, but rather seeks to reenforce the importance of sovereign 
power as a key element in ascertaining the limitations on state 
court jurisdiction. 127 Having made that point, but having not re­
solved the relationship of "power" and "fairness" in this area, the 
Court remained silent on the issue for almost twenty years. 
Finally, in Shaffer v. Heitner 128 the Court decided the first in a 
series of cases which attempted to clarify the elements of a due 
process analysis. In Shaffer the Court rejected the assertion of ju­
risdiction by Delaware over nonresident directors of a Delaware 
corporation in a derivative action. The Court's most important 
and significant statement in Shaffer was that "all assertions of 
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the stan­
dards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 129 However, 
the Court also sought to evaluate whether assertions of jurisdic­
tion could be justified by examining "the relationship among the 
defendant, the forum, and the litigation."13o Implicit in this ap­
proach was a recognition that both "power" and "fairness" were 
relevant to a jurisdictional analysis. 131 Similarly, in Kulko v. Supe­
rior Court 132 the Court recognized the relevance of "power" and 
"fairness" in this area when it rejected California's assertion of 
jurisdiction over a nonresident father in a child support case. 133 
rem, quasi in relll and in personam. This was after having appeared to reject the 
significance of these categories in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950). 
126. E.g., Clermont, supra note Ill, at 419; Hazard, supra note 110, at 244. 
127. The majority's disagreement with the dissent is that the latter, in an 
opinion written by Justice Black, would focus on the reasonableness of the fo­
rum as the key to deciding state court jurisdiction. 357 U.S. at 259. Interest­
ingly. both sides sought support from the language of the International Shoe 
opinion, which only means that that opinion raised both criteria as relevant to a 
due process analysis without clarifying their relationship. See supra text accom­
panying notes 116-19. 
128. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
129. Id. at 212. 
130. !d. at 204. 
131. Clermont, supra note Ill, at 421 n.55. At least one judge has viewed 
Shaffer as central to a revised analysis of nationwide service cases because of its 
"abandonment of territorial sovereignty strictures" in a due process analysis. 
Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 828 (6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J., 
dissenting), mt. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1981). 
132. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
133. !d. at 92. 
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The Court concluded that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts 
with California to assert control over him,134 and thus it did not 
consider other interests which might have been relevant to the 
fairness of the forum. 135 
The Court reenforced and made the relationship between 
"power" and "fairness" explicit in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Wood50n.l 36 In that case Oklahoma sought to assert jurisdiction 
over two New York corporations neither of which did business in 
Oklahoma. These defendants were involved in the sale of an au­
tomobile in New York to the plaintiffs who were then residents of 
New York. Subsequently the plaintiffs left New York and were 
involved in an accident in Oklahoma in which the vehicle burned. 
They filed a products liability suit in Oklahoma against, among 
others, the two New York corporations, who then moved to dis­
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court refused to overturn a denial of this motion by the trial 
court. 137 In reversing this decision, Justice White, speaking for 
six Justices, began by asserting the dual purposes of a minimum 
contacts-due 'process analysis: 
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen 
to perform two related, but distinguishable functions. It 
protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating 
in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure 
that the States, through their courts, do not reach out 
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co­
equal sovereigns in a federal system.l 38 
After analyzing these functions in general terms, the Court con­
cluded by stating that even a convenient state forum does not 
comport with due process if the state lacks "power" over the de­
fendants since the due process clause acts as an "instrument of 
interstate federalism." 139 If, as the Court suggests, the functions 
of sovereign power and fairness are related, and overreaching the 
134. /d. at 101. 
135. [d. at 98-10 1. 
136. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
137. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 
1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
138. 444 U.S. at 291-92. 
139. !d. at 294, The Court reiterated this in a companion case to Woodsoll 
which was decided the same day. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980); 
Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Commellt Oil 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L. 
REV. 407, 421 (1980). 
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limits of sovereignty warrants a denial of jurisdiction, then should 
it not follow that a violation of norms of fairness also warrant a 
denial of jurisdiction? 
The Court has shown an increased willingness to focus its 
attention on the "fairness" issue in analyzing jurisdiction ques­
tions. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee 140 this point was made clear in its review of a decision by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 141 The 
Court of Appeals in Bauxites had affirmed a district court deci­
sion 142 to impose a sanction under rule 37(b)(2). The sanction, 
which established personal jurisdiction over a defendant, had 
been ordered by the district court for failure to provide discovery 
on the issue of jurisdiction as had been ordered. In the process of 
affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, Justice White 
pointed out that personal jurisdiction placed "a restriction on ju­
dicial power ... as a matter of individual liberty," and was there­
fore waivable. 143 In a footnote he sought to clarify the underlying 
concerns which govern personal jurisdiction and the application 
of due process: 
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of 
personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects 
an element of federalism and the character of state sov­
ereignty vis-a-vis other states. . . . The restriction on 
state sovereign power described in World- Wide Volkswagen 
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of 
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Pro­
cess Clause. That Clause is the only source of the per­
sonal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself 
makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, 
if the federalism concept operated as an independent re­
striction on the sovereign power of the court, it would 
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction re-
• 144 qmrement .... 
Bauxites takes a step beyond Woodson in that it emphasizes the 
Court's willingness to focus on the concept of fairness or an "in­
dividualliberty interest" as the ultimate concern of the due pro-
140. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
141. Compagnie des Bauxites v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 
1981), ajJ'd, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
142. The opinion of the district court was unreported. 
143. 456 U.S. at 702-03 & n.lO. 
144. /d. at 702-03 n.l0. 
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cess clause. The opinion makes it clear that simply focusing on 
the traditional federalism questions of "power" and "sover­
eignty" is not adequate in analyzing questions of personal juris­
diction. Those questions are not the ones with which the due 
process clause is concerned. Since due process ultimately 
touches individual liberty interests, it follows that these interests 
cannot be swept away without consideration when "power" is not 
at issue as, for example, in the typical nationwide service cases. 
The Court once against emphasized the importance of fair­
ness over and above issues of power in Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz. 145 In an opinion written by Justice Brennan,146 the 
Court addressed the individual liberty interests which the due 
process clause seeks to protect and delineated the factors relevant 
to protecting those interests. 147 The Court stated that traditional 
minimum contacts were necessary to establish the defendants' tie 
with the forum much in the way the Court had required in Hanson 
and Woodson,148 but, at the same time, it also emphasized the im­
portance of fairness factors once minimum contacts are estab­
lished. 149 As the Court stated: 
Once it has been decided that a defendant purpose­
fully established minimum contacts within the forum 
State, these contacts may be considered in light of other 
factors to determine whether the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substan­
tial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington . ... 
Thus courts in "appropriate case[s]" may evaluate "the 
burden on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in ob­
taining convenient and effective relief," "the interstate 
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies," and the "shared interest of 
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies." World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 
. . . . These considerations sometimes serve to establish 
145. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
146. It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan had written strong dis­
sents in earlier cases. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 
286.299 (1980) (Brennan.J.. dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186.219 
(1977) (Brennan. J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
147. See 471 U.S. at 471-72 & n.13 (citing Insurance Corp. ofIr. v. Compa­
gnie de Bauxites de Guinee. 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.1O (1982)). 
148. /d. at 474-76. 
149. /d. at 476-78. 
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the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing 
of minimum contacts than would otherwise be re­
quired. . . . On the other hand, where a defendant who 
purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents 
seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compel­
ling case that the presence of some other considerations 
would render jurisdiction unreasonable. I 50 
It is clear that the Court has reinforced the view that due pro­
cess is concerned with more than questions of sovereign power, 
and that in deciding personal jurisdiction questions in the state 
court context the fairness to the defendant, i.e., the defendant's 
individual liberty interests, is of central importance in determin­
ing personal jurisdiction even when the forum has sufficient con­
nections to justify an exertion of sovereign power. 
B. Application to Nationwide jurisdiction Cases 
Such an analysis in the state court jurisdiction area must be 
given serious consideration in the analogous area of nationwide 
jurisdiction cases. In the nationwide service of process cases, 
courts have correctly pointed out that a minimum contacts-due 
process analysis which serves to limit coequal sovereigns is not 
relevant to the power to assert jurisdiction within the United 
States. 151 They have also recognized that such an analysis, 
adapted from the state court jurisdiction analogue, is relevant to 
assertions of jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits of the 
United States. 152 Once attention is focused on assertions of juris­
diction within the United States, however, it is inconsistent to 
conclude that a minimum contacts-due process approach can be 
discarded because, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, a sepa­
rate function of that approach is to protect defendants from unfair 
and distant litigation. Since both of these functions must be satis­
fied to comport with due process, it is clear that the fair forum 
function must be established in order for there to be a proper 
ISO. !d. at 476-77 (citations omined). The concern of the Court for the 
fairness of the forum was the basis for its judgment in Asahi Metal Industry v. 
Superior Court, 107 S. Cl. 1026 (1987), that it would violate due process for 
California to assert jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer. While the Court 
divided evenly on the issue of minimum contacts, eight Justices agreed that it 
would violate due process to assert jurisdiction because it would be an unfair 
and unreasonable forum. [d. at 1033-35. 
151. E.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). 
152. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 
(2d Cir. 1972). 
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assertion of jurisdiction. 153 
This is particularly so in light of the Court's recogmtlOn in 
Bauxites that all of the restrictions that due process requires are 
intended to protect individual liberty interests of the defendant. 
If individual liberty, or fairness, is the key, then whether or not 
the defendant is within the sovereign's boundaries, and therefore 
subject to its sovereign power, she is entitled to protection from 
an unfair choice of forum. It is illogical to contend that a person 
is protected from an unreasonable choice of forum only if she is a 
defendant not subject to the sovereign's power; but once such 
person is so subject, the due process clause would give no protec­
tion against an arbitrary and inconvenient choice of forum. Thus, 
if a defendant lived in New Jersey and had no contacts with Cali­
fornia, but was sued in California state court, the due process 
clause would protect her from the burden of defending in that 
distant forum. But if the suit were based on a violation of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the due process clause would 
not protect her even if it were an unreasonable choice of fo­
rum. 154 The defendant's only hope would be to convince the 
court to grant a transfer. '55 
It might be argued that such a result is correct because Con­
gress, in adopting certain remedial statutes, had decided that it is 
of paramount importance to protect the potential plaintiffs even if 
such protection results in greatly inconveniencing the party who 
must defend far from home. 156 But this is only to accept the prin­
ciple that Congress has the power to authorize nationwide service 
153. 444 U.S. at 293-94; Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 
1026, 1033-35 (1987). 
154. Following the logic of those courts which suggest that due process 
only requires fair notice in suits in which service is based on nationwide service 
of process, it would also seem that any assertion of jurisdiction by a federal court 
would only be limited by a fair notice test. Thus, if Corporation A were sued on 
a federal question in a federal court located in State X and service was accom­
plished under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3) by serving an agent of the corporation who 
was transiently present in the state taking a train through State X to State r, due 
process would not require a denial of jurisdiction even if the corporation had no 
other connection with State X. Such a result is compelled by a rejection of a 
fairness due process standard when there is power over the defendant. Bllt see 
supra note 17. See also Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE LJ. 289 (1956). A different result 
may ensue if service is based on a state long-arm statute pursuant to Rule 4(e). 
See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1123 n.6 (1966). 
155. E.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978), rell'd 011 other 
grounds sub nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). 
156. E.g., Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Md. 1971). 
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of process. 157 Such congressional power is still limited by fifth 
amendment due process considerations. The real question is the 
nature of that due process limitation when sovereign power is not 
involved. In light of the functions suggested by the Woodson 
Court, and the amplification of the underlying concerns devel­
oped in Bauxites and Burger King, it is clear that a fairness compo­
nent is an integral part of a due process analysis, which must be 
satisfied even in the absence of any concern over sovereign 
power. Granting that Congress is empowered to authorize na­
tionwide service of process, the case by case implementation of 
that authority should still be limited by a due process requirement 
of fairness to the defendant in the choice of the particular 
forum. 15s 
There are a number of arguments that may be made in oppo-
157. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10. 
158. This application of a fairness standard based on the Bauxites analysis 
was rejected by the district court in First Federal Savings & Loan v. Oppenheim, 
Appel, Dixon & Co., 634 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court pointed out 
that the author of Bauxites, Justice White, gave no indication of changing the 
"legal landscape" in the area, and had indicated that there were no constitu­
tional restrictions on nationwide service in an earlier dissent. Id. at 1347. See 
supra note 60. Moreover, the court relied heavily on Mariash and Fitzsimmons for 
its view that a fairness analysis was inappropriate. 634 F. Supp. at 1347-48. Fi­
nally, the court felt that to adopt such a standard would make decisions difficult 
because courts would be required to make a highly factbound analysis. !d. at 
1348. As to whether the "legal landscape" has been changed, a full review of 
the jurisdictional cases suggests this is a logical progression for the Court. See 
supra text accompanying notes 110-50. This analysis also suggests the weak­
nesses of l\1ariash and Fitzsimmons. In response to the argument that such a 
factbound analysis will create problems, it should be noted that the Supreme 
Court has clearly rejected this argument in jurisdictional cases. Shaffer v. Heit­
ner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977) (stating in response to argument that in rem juris­
diction should not be subjected to inherently uncertain test of International Shoe 
that fairness standard could be easily applied in most cases and in those cases 
which were difficult Court was not prepared to sacrifice fairness for simplicity). 
It is interesting to note that the Oppenheim court had no difficulty doing a fairness 
analysis in a footnote. 634 F. Supp. at 1348 n.9. 
It has been argued that a constitutional limitation on Congress' power to 
authorize nationwide service of process is necessary because safeguards of a 
nonconstitutional nature, such as venue provisions, could be eliminated by Con­
gress, and even if those provisions were not eliminated, defendants would be 
disadvantaged because of the absence of the right of collateral attack, and the 
difficulty of obtaining review and reversal of what are perceived as primarily dis­
cretionary trial court decisions. Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Per­
sonalJurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1,36-37 (1984). It should 
be noted, however, that even in the absence of venue provisions, courts could 
provide some protection for defendants under principles of transfer and f01'llm 
non conveniens. See infra text accompanying notes 169-78. It has been suggested 
that in the context of an overall scheme to modernize venue and service of pro­
cess in federal court, it would be appropriate to have a general provision for 
nationwide service of process with venue provisions used to ensure a convenient 
forum. Barett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Re-
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sition to this view. As the courts suggested in Briggs and Driver, it 
might be argued that a fairness-due process analysis is relevant 
only where the sovereign is attempting to assert power beyond its 
borders.159 But, as argued above, this approach is logically incon­
sistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in the analogous area of 
state court jurisdiction. 160 
A second argument was suggested by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Fitzsimmons. 1 G 1 The 
court rejected the consideration of fairness as a constitutional re­
striction because it had always been "applied under the rubric of 
forum non conveniens."162 In so stating, the court left open the 
question whether the fairness factor had "constitutional signifi­
cance."163 In using the term "forum non conveniens" the court pre­
sumably intended to encompass all rhe aspects of venue which 
seek to limit the choice of forum within the judicial system that 
has adjudicatory power over the defendant. 
This concept of federal venue as a means of allocating cases 
operates in two ways: first, by statutes which arbitrarily denote a 
number of locations in which a case may be heard. 164 Such provi­
sions are structured to allow for suit in certain arbitrarily defined 
form, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608, 629 (1954); ALI STUDY, supra note 26, §§ 1314 (Fed­
eral Question Jurisdiction), 217 (multi-party, multi-state diversity). 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 47-55. 
160. Clermont, supra note Ill, at 439 n.132 ("[T]he tendency to ignore the 
separate concept of forum-reasonableness explains the misleading statements 
[that power is all that is relevant in this analysis] in the Stafford-type authorities 
... and the Driver-type cases .... ") (citations omitted). 
161. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). 
162. Id. at 334 n.5; accord FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 255-58 
(5th Cir. 1981). For a further discussion, see supra note 100. Decisions such as 
these should be seriously questioned in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent 
decision in Bauxites. Thus, in Burstein v. State Bar of California, the court ques­
tioned, without deciding, the continued vitality of Jim Walter when it stated that 
"this court in Jim Walter Corp. suggested that the conceptual requirements of 
both [fifth and fourteenth amendment] due process clauses were the same, albeit 
relating to different sovereigns. If this is true, then the rationale of Jim Ira Iter 
Corp. may have been undermined by Insurance Corp. of Ireland." 693 F.2d 511, 
516 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982); Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D. Tex. 
1983) (suggesting thatJim Walter was "seriously undermine[d]" by the Bauxites 
decision); accord GRM v. Equine Inv. & Management Group, 596 F. Supp. 307, 
312-15 (S.D. Tex. 1984). In GRM, the court, however, cited some district court 
opinions which have continued to apply a "national-contacts" test. 596 F. Supp. 
at 314 n.9. 
163. 589 F.2d at 334 n.5. 
164. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) (1982) (permits diversity action to be 
brought in district where all plaintiffs reside, defendants reside, or claim arose). 
Since such provisions are arbitrary they may allow for suit in a highly inconve­
nient place while not allowing it in a convenient one. Also the venue provisions 
adopted in relation to nationwide service provisions are invariably drafted 
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fora without regard to the convenience or fairness of those 
choices in particular cases. Whether such a provision will be 
helpful in avoiding an unfair choice of forum depends exclusively 
on whether the particular statute is more or less restrictive in the 
choices it permits. 165 For example, in cases under section 
1391(e) the provision will do little to limit the plaintiff's choice 
since she may always sue in the judicial district where she re­
sides. lfi6 Even in cases where plaintiff's residence is not an ac­
ceptable forum, the statutory choices may be broadened by 
language such as that in the venue provision used in Mariash and 
Fitzsimmons. Such provisions permit venue in any district where 
"any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred"-a 
provision which has been read broadly by the courtS. 167 On the 
other hand, if a venue statute contains neither of these provisions, 
but only permits suit where the defendant is an inhabitant, is 
found or transacts business, it is more likely to ensure a fair and 
convenient forum. 168 This is only to suggest that Congress may 
avoid due process problems by carefully limiting venue in nation­
wide service cases. It does not address the question whether due 
process operates to set parameters for congressional action which 
would become relevant when the plaintiff's forum of choice was 
unreasonable in a particular case. 
The second method of allocation operates by transfer provi­
sions which allow courts to move a suit from one district to an­
other for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of 
justice. 169 As such, these provisions operate in a fashion analo­
gous to the common law concept of forum non conveniens. 170 If the 
broadly to favor the plaintiff consistent with the purpose of the service provi­
sion. E.g., id. § 1391(d). 
165. Fullerton, supra note 158, at 71-76. 
166. That provision was the basis for venue in Driver, 74 F.R.D. at 400, 
while venue in Briggs was based on another provision in 1391(e) which author­
ized venue where any defendant had an official residence. 569 F.2d at 4-6. 
167. For example, the Mariash court concluded that this provision was met 
since the transfer agent had to be contacted in New York to remove the restric­
tive legend on the stock in order to complete the transaction which had nothing 
to do with the reasonableness of the forum. 496 F.2d at 1143-45. Also a 
number of courts have adopted a co-conspirator venue theory which grants 
venue as to all defendants sued in a case involving a common scheme if anyone 
defendant has acted within the forum district. E.g., Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1985). • 
168. See Fullerton, supra note 158, at 74-76. 
169. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1982). 
170. The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens in the federal court 
system is only utilized in those rare cases where the more convenient forum is a 
state court, or a court in a foreign country. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. 
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concept of a constitutional basis for a fairness analysis is accepted, 
it may be less important whether such analysis is denominated 
under a "rubric" of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens, I7I since 
the resulting analysis should be the same. As a matter of struc­
ture, however, the maintenance of this standard under a jurisdic­
tional title would be superior. This is so because the 
development of concepts such as forum non conveniens and transfer 
were intended to limit a jurisdictional system which focused on 
physical power over the defendant, rather than intended as meth­
ods of finding a fair forum for the litigation. 172 It would be more 
appropriate to structure a jurisdictional analysis to deal with the 
affirmative responsibility to provide a constitutionally fair forum; . 
and as a consequence to de-emphasize these other analyses which 
historically have not had a constitutional basis, leaving wide dis­
cretion in the trial court. 173 
Those who support the predominance of the concept of 
transfer in this area have further argued that, wh~le a constitu­
tional fairness doctrine does exist, it is unnecessary to consider 
because all the problems it would address are handled by subcon­
stitutional concepts such as transfer. As one court has stated: 
Some commentators have suggested that the due pro­
cess clause of the fifth amendment imposes upon the 
personal jurisdiction of the federal courts restrictions 
similar to those imposed on state courts under the four­
teenth amendment. . . . As this court has observed, 
"[a]lthough the propriety of service issuing from a fed­
eral court need not necessarily be tested by the same 
yardstick as is the constitutional limitation upon service 
of process from a state court, the latter standard pro­
vides a helpful and often used guideline." ... Strict fed­
eral venue requirements, however, have made it 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (1976). An example of this 
limited use of/orum non conveniens in federal court is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 
454 U.S. 235 (1981). In Reyno the Supreme Court pointed out that transfer is 
more than a mere codification of/orum 1/011 conveniells, but is instead a revision 
which gives greater discretion to the court to transfer since it would not involve 
a dismissal. Id. at 253. 
171. One problem raised by the choice of title is that historically defend­
ants have had greater freedom to collaterally attack a default judgment for lack 
of personal jurisdiction, but not for lack of venue. Currie, The Federal Courts aud 
the American Law Institute. Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268. 303-04 & n.430 (1969); 
Fullerton, supm note 158. at 36-37. 
172. Ehrenzweig, supm note 154, at 305-09. 
173. See id. at 312. 
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unnecessary to develop ajudicial doctrine of the limits of 
personal jurisdiction in federal cases. Thus, as a practi­
cal matter, the most significant restraint on the personal 
jurisdiction of federal courts in federal cases is service of 
process .... 174 
There are several reasons why it would be unwise to follow 
this approach. The purpose of a constitutional limitation on ju­
risdiction is to serve as a floor which limits Congress' legislative 
use of venue and the discretionary right of courts to change 
venue. 175 In the same way that fairness serves as a constitutional 
limit on assertions of jurisdiction by state courts, it should serve 
as a limit on the federal system's use of process and venue. In 
addition, by only addressing the subconstitutional issue of venue, 
such an analysis encourages arbitrary line drawing between juris­
diction and venue. These arbitrary distinctions, in turn, lead 
courts to erroneously view jurisdiction as exclusively a question of 
"power" and venue as the sole basis behind considerations of 
fairness. 176 The development of a due process analysis in the 
state-court jurisdiction cases has shown the increasing interde­
pendency of power and fairness as analytic tools. 177 This should 
be encouraged by a more unified jurisdictional approach which 
recognizes this interdependency. Finally, to focus on the "fair­
ness" as the domain of a subconstitutional venue analysis is to de­
emphasize an issue of central significance which would be best 
174. Terry v. Raymond InCI, Inc., 658 F.2d 398, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit subsequently overruled Teny on other 
grounds. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 427 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (overruled only to extent that it held no specific congressional au­
thorization was necessary to assert jurisdiction). 
175. See Clermont, supra note Ill, at 437-41. Professor Clermont has sug­
'gested a "reformulation" of jurisdictional analysis which recognizes the consti­
tutional concept of fairness under the title of "forum-reasonableness." 
I 76. A better way of distinguishing jurisdiction and venue is based on the 
view that 
jurisdiction is relatively more concerned with fairness and venue more 
with inconvenience. If the two concepts should be described as apply­
ing along a continuum, one extreme might be demonstrated by the case 
in which the corporate defendant's contacts with the forum were so 
minimal that it would be patently unfair, let alone inconvenient, to re­
quire him to defend an action there. Due Process would say that the 
forum lacked jurisdiction .... At the other extreme would be the case 
in which not only were jurisdiction and venue proper, but the inconven­
ience caused the corporation by requiring it to defend the suit where 
brought would be so slight that a motion for discretionary transfer ... 
would be denied. 
Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966) (citations omitted). 
177. See JIIj)l'a text accompanying notes 110-50. 
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confronted head-on by courts. 178 
In addressing these arguments It IS important to recall that 
there may be situations in which problems of convenience and 
fairness can be solved by venue provisions, but because such tools 
are available does not mean that a constitutional due process 
standard cannot continue to operate as a limiting standard of ju­
dicial control. To conclude otherwise would be illogical in light 
of the Supreme Court's efforts to clarify the underlying concerns 
of due process in the state court area. This point was made clear 
by Justice Brennan in Burger King, where he emphasized that even 
if a defendant had sufficient forum activities to warrant an asser- . 
tion of jurisdiction, other fairness factors might warrant a denial 
of jurisdiction. Justice Brennan went on to point out that many of 
those considerations could be dealt with "through means short of 
finding jurisdiction unconstitutional." 179 This did not lead to the 
conclusion that a constitutional standard was unnecessary, but 
rather, that "[m]inimum requirements inherent in the concept of 
'fair play and substantial justice' may defeat the reasonableness of 
jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in fo­
rum activities."18o The clear import of the Court's reasoning is 
that while venue and transfer provisions may avoid many 
problems before they reach constitutional proportions, the due 
process clause continues to be present and to operate as a mini­
mum standard of fairness to protect defendants from being un­
fairly treated. 
178. See s'Jpra notes 158 and 171. Thus in a case such as Briggs it is possible 
that the trial court would quickly dispose of the transfer question because it felt 
that if it had jurisdiction because it had "power," it need not be concerned with 
the exercise of discretionary power based on convenience. See supm note 44. 
The Court of Appeals in Driver did raise the possibility of transfer, which was not 
mentioned in the district court's opinion. The Court of Appeals stated that it 
would expect courts to be sympathetic to motions for change of venue 
when defendants would otherwise be substantially prejudiced and when 
there is an alternative venue that would protect parties' rights. Further­
more, we note that officers of the federal government are different from 
private defendants because they can anticipate that their official acts 
may affect people in every part of the United States. 
577 F.2d at 157. While the court's suggestion that change of venue be given 
serious consideration is important, the fact that it was little considered in Dril'PJ' 
and Briggs gives support to the view that the discretionary nature and history of 
transfer leave substantial risks for defendants which can only be protected with a 
constitutional due process minimum requirement. Courts are simply lOO willing 
to exercise their discretion to allow the plaintiff's choice without careful analysis. 
See Fitzsimmons, 589 F.2d at 334 n.6. 
179. 471 U.S. at 477. 
180. [d.; Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033-35 
(1987). 
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C. Fair Forum Standard 
If such an approach is correct, then it is clear that due pro­
cess does require a fair forum for the defendant. The question 
remains, however, what standards are relevant to this determina­
tion of fairness. It is not possible to simply use the tests which the 
Supreme Court has developed in the state jurisdictional cases. In 
setting up that ,flexible concept,181 the Court was concerned 
about the question of a fair forum and the sovereign power of the 
state. 182 Therefore it focused on "the relationship among the de­
fendant, the forum, and the litigation" in determining the appro­
priateness of an assertion of jurisdiction. 183 However, federal 
courts would only be concerned with the fair forum function in 
establishing standards in nationwide service of process cases. In 
light of this and the congressional purpose of providing a conve­
nient forum for the plaintiff in these cases, less emphasis need be 
placed on the defendant, since there is no justification for favor­
ing one party over the other. 184 Rather, it would be appropriate 
for a court to make its determination by looking more broadly at 
both parties, the transaction which underlies the lawsuit, the na­
ture of the litigation and the relationship of these factors to the 
chosen forum.18s This analysis is appropriate in the context of 
situations where the fair allocation of cases within the federal 
court system is of concern, rather than the power to require the 
defendant to appear. 186 
181. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). 
182. See, e.g., Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292-94. 
183. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204. 
184. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 154, at 1127-28. 
185. This approach led Justice Black to dissent in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235 (1958), and state his view of what was relevant to deciding whether a 
defendant could be required to appear in a particular state's forum. 
It seems to me that where a transaction has as much relationship to a 
State as Mrs. Donner's appointment had to Florida its courts ought to 
have power to adjudicate controversies arising out of that transaction, 
unless litigation there would impose such a heavy and disproportionate 
burden on a nonresident that it would offend what this Court has re­
ferred to as "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 
Id. at 258-59 (Black, j., dissenting). Fullerton has sugg'ested a more defendant­
focused approach, which would analyze the inconvenience to the defendant and 
whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated litigation in the fo­
rum, along with government interests in litigating in a particular place in decid­
ing whether the assertion of jurisdiction is proper. Fullerton, wpm note 158, at 
38-60. 
186. It has been suggested that this analysis is appropriate even when the 
case involves state court jurisdiction. E.g., Hazard, supm note 110, at 281; Sil­
berman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Elld of (/11 Em, 53 N.V.U.L. RE\,. 33, 79-90 
(1978). Bul see Louis, supm note 139, at 408-09, 423-25. 
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This approach was suggested and embellished upon by Jus­
tice Brennan in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Shaffer v. 
Heitner. 187 In Shaffer (a state court jurisdiction case) he argued 
that the due process analysis was "closely related" to the analysis 
of choice of laws because 
[i]n either case an important linchpin is the extent of 
contacts between the controversy, the parties, and the 
forum State .... [I]mportant considerations certainly in­
clude the expectancies of the parties and the fairness of 
governing the defendants' acts and behavior by rules of 
conduct created by a given jurisdiction. . .. [T]he deci­
sion that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's laws 
and rules should prove to be highly relevant to the fair­
ness of permitting that same State to accept jurisdiction 
for adjudicating the controversy.188 
While we are not concerned with choice of law here, those same 
basic factors seem most relevant to any fairness analysis. 
A similar note was sounded in Woodson, where the Court set 
forth elements, in addition to the burden on the defendant, which 
it thought were relevant to the fairness question. These factors 
included: 
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, ... 
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effec­
tive relief ... at least when that interest is not adequately 
protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum, 
... the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining 
the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the 
shared interest of the several States in furthering funda­
mental substantive social policies .... 189 
Putting aside any particular state's interest, and substituting for it 
the interest of the federal government, these opinions support an 
analysis which focuses on the plaintiff's and defendant's desire to 
litigate in a particular forum and the government's concern that 
special protection be given to certain classes of plaintiffs, but 
which at the same time allows for an economical resolution of dis-
187. 433 U.S. at 219 (Brennan, j., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
188. Id. at 225; see also Woodson, 444 U.S. at 299-301 (Brennan, j., 
dissenting) . 
189. lI'oodson, 444 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted). 
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putes. Weighing these elements, a court would decide whether it 
was warranted in requiring a defendant to appear. 
A comparable formula was suggested in Oxford First Corp. v. 
PNC Liquidating Corp., 190 in which the district court attempted to 
place some fifth amendment fairness limits on nationwide service 
of process in a suit under the Securities Exchange Act. The fac­
tors which the Oxford court considered relevant to its decision 
were (1) the extent of the defendant's contacts with the district in 
which the action was brought; (2) the inconvenience to the de­
fendant of having to defend in a jurisdiction other than the place 
of his residence; (3) judicial economy; (4) the probable situs of 
discovery; and (5) the nature of the regulated activity and its im­
pact outside defendant's state of residence or business. 191 These 
factors are certainly helpful. However, as has already been noted, 
once fairness to litigate in a particular place is accepted as the 
basis of this analysis, rather than the power to require the defend­
ant to appear, it would be proper to eliminate those factors which 
focus exclusively on the needs and burdens placed on the defend­
ant, and substitute a balancing of the interests of both parties and 
the sovereign in efficiently disposing of the case. 192 Once this is 
done it would be possihle to focus on the underlying transaction, 
the litigation and the interests of all those involved in determin­
ing whether the litigation is in a constitutionally adequate forum 
for due process purposes. 
Thus, a court should consider a variety of factors in deter­
mining whether an assertion of jurisdiction under a nationwide 
service of process provision should require a person to defend in 
190. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.O. Pa. 1974). As indicated earlier, this opinion 
was criticized in Fitzsimmons on the view that a fairness test was not appropriate 
in these circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100. Contra Smith 
v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 674 F. Supp. 542, 544 (W.O. W. Va. 1987) (following 
Oxford First because it "recognizes the underlying rationale of fundamental fair­
ness to restrictions on jurisdiction"). 
191. 372 F. Supp. at 203-04. 
192. Thus, in GRlI1 v. Equine Investment & Management Gro liP , the district 
court cited Oxford First with approval, but in setting forth its fairness test the 
court made a subtle shift towards a more balanced consideration of fairness. 
596 F. Supp. 307, 314 (S.D. Tex. 1984). Its factors were: 
(1) the. burden imposed upon the defendants by Texas litigation, 
(2) defendants' reasonable expectations and the foreseeability of Texas 
litigation, (3) plaintiffs' interest in convenient and effective relief, 
(4) the federal judicial system's interest in efficiently resolving contro­
versies, and (5) Texas's interest in having a court in Texas adjudicate 
this dispute. 
!d. at 315. In a footnote the court suggested that the five factors could be sum­
marized as weighing "the relative equities and convenience between parties." 
Id. at 315 n.12. 
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a particular district court. One such factor would be where the 
events took place and whether the witnesses and various types of 
evidence would be available in the chosen forum. On a practical 
level it would be highly inefficient to allow a case to be conducted 
in a court which cannot conveniently hear it. 193 
A second factor is the relative convenience of the plaintiff 
and the defendant, and their reasonable expectations in litigating 
in the chosen forum. Of particular significance is whether either 
party's activities are so localized, or conversely, so pervasively 
multistate, as to warrant allowing the case to be heard in the cho­
sen forum. 194 Given the nature of the parties and the location of 
the forum where the plaintiff instituted suit, it may be the case 
that litigating in the chosen forum would not be unreasonable for 
the defendant, whereas requiring the plaintiff to travel to the de­
fendant's residence might be. For example, if the plaintiff was an 
individual residing in the forum, and the defendant was a corpo­
ration whose business reasonably lead it to expect suits in other 
districts, the court would be acting properly in giving substantial 
weight to the plaintiff's choice. This would be particularly true if 
the defendant's ·multistate activities aggressively impinged on a 
plaintiff whose activities were local to the chosen forum. 195 Even 
though the defendant's aggressiveness was not sufficient to satisfy 
a state court minimum contacts test, it might be sufficient under a 
more flexible analysis that was concerned only with the fairness of 
the forum and not with the sovereign power of the court involved. 
Finally, it would be important for the court to weigh its own 
interest, and that of the parties, in resolving the case in one pro­
ceeding. This would be particularly important in cases where the 
other fairness factors were not dispositive. For example, in a case 
involving multiple districts and multiple plaintiffs or defendants, 
various interests could lead to a situation where different fora 
would be fairest depending on the point of view considered. At 
this juncture the court should have some flexibility to decide 
whether the plaintiff's choice was reasonable, and if so, whether 
to hear the entire case in that one location. 1 !)(} 
193. See Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal.3d 143, 150-51,545 P.2d 264, 268-
69, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356-57 (1976). 
194. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 154, at 1168. 
195. See Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal jurisdiction .·lfter Shaffer and 
Kulko and a .\fodest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood­
son, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 861, 891-92 (1978). 
196. See. f.g .• Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.2d 893, 458 
P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). This legitimate policy concern is also the 
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If the interests of the parties were in equipoise, then the 
court should resolve the dispute in favor of the plaintiff's choice, 
since there would be an absence of unjustified unfairness to the 
defendant. Given the absence, the congressional purpose evi­
denced in the particular statute of favoring the plaintiff's choice 
of forum, should be upheld. 
The factors suggested here are not intended as an exclusive 
list but rather as an open ended series of suggestions informing 
the type of factual questions necessary to consider in determining 
the fairness under the due process clause of requiring litigation to 
be conducted in a particular court. Even if these standards are 
used by the courts, it does not necessarily mean that the result in 
any particular case will be different than it has been in the past. 
But in making its decision, a court will be applying an appropriate 
standard to determine the parties' rights. 
Particularly in some areas, such as cases under the Inter­
pleader Act, it has already been suggested earlier in this article l97 
that courts should weigh heavily the plaintiff's need for a single 
forum for resolution of the dispute. It would be unfair to the 
plaintiff in those circumstances to decline jurisdiction over all of 
the defendants in any reasonably chosen forum. Thus the inter­
ests of the plaintiff and the judicial system in a single adjudication 
would outweigh the interests of any particular defendant. 198 
In other areas, however, more emphasis may be placed on 
some of the other factors mentioned. Of special importance may 
be the relative convenience of obtaining discovery and evidence, 
as well as the district court's familiarity with the locale in which 
the transaction took place. Also the relative interests of the plain­
tiff and defendant in having a convenient forum may be impor­
tant, especially as this relates to those who have aggressively 
pursued or imposed themselves on others. Thus, in a case such 
as Mariash 199 the facts indicated that the plaintiff was contacted in 
New York and the various opinion letters were sent to New York 
even though the corporation whose stock was involved was incor­
porated in Massachusetts and the defendant-attorneys resided in 
basis for the broad application of venue provisions which courts have used 
under a co-conspirator venue theory. See supra note 167. 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. 
198. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 
(1950); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 346-48, 316 P.2d 960, 965-
66 (1957), appeal dismissed and mi. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958). 
199. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). For a further discussion see supra text 
accompanying notes 77-89. 
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Massachusetts.2oo Also many of the nonparty witnesses were in 
New York.201 Given the multistate nature of the defendants' ac­
tivities and the fact that so much of the underlying transaction 
occurred in New York, it would be reasonable to require the at­
torney-defendants to appear there, even if they did not have the 
requisite contacts to satisfy a state jurisdiction minimum contacts 
test. 202 
In Fitzsimmons,203 the defendant, Barton, who challenged ju­
risdiction, had made several trips to the chosen forum. These 
trips were apparently not so directly related to the fraudulent ac­
tivity as to satisfy the Illinois long-arm statute, which the district 
court had erroneously assumed applied.204 Since the court of ap­
peals concluded that the assertion of jurisdiction did not require a 
fairness analysis, it chose not to develop the facts necessary to 
make a firm analysis in this case. However, the opinion suggests 
that the other defendants in the lawsuit were subject to jurisdic­
tion in the forum since they chose not to challenge on personal 
jurisdiction grounds.205 Beyond this, the nature of Barton's trips 
indicate multistate activities206 which should have reasonably led 
200.496 F.2d at 1140-41. 
201. [d. This would include the plaintiff's broker, independent legal coun­
sel hired to give an opinion letter and the corporation's transfer agent. [d. at 
1141. Also the other defendants presumably had substantial relations with New 
York since they chose not to challenge the assertion of jurisdiction, although this 
is never specifically discussed in the opinion. If the court had required the anal­
ysis which is suggested in this article, it presumably would have required more 
discovery, instead of relying on the "barest skeleton of a record" as it did here. 
[d. at 1140. 
202. The district court had in fact dismissed the defendant-attorneys on the 
erroneous assumption that the New York long-arm statute applied and that 
these defendants were not subject to jurisdiction under it. [d. at 1142. 
203. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). For a further discusision, see supra text 
accompanying notes 90-100. 
204. 589 F.2d at 331-32. Defendant Barton was president and chief execu­
tive officer of United Founders Life Insurance Company whose business was pri­
marily generated by the Teamsters' Pension Fund, whose Trustees were the 
plaintiffs in this action. He was also a director and officer of Reis Corporation 
which was a creditor of United Founders. In turn Reis was indebted to the Pen­
sion Fund. The Pension Fund considered the possibility of self-insuring, and 
this created the possibility that United Founders would not be able to pay Reis, 
and Reis would then be unable to pay the Pension Fund. Ultimately the Pension 
Fund did not self-insure, but it did alter the terms of its insurance. This led to a 
need to restructure the Reis indebtedness to the Pension Fund. It was during 
this restructuring that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations took place. 
The district court felt that Barton's trips to Illinois did not constitute sufficient 
contacts with Illinois because it was satisfied that those trips related to self-insur­
ance plans and not to the debt restructuring. [d. 
205. See id. at 331. 
206. !d. at 334 n.6. 
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him to expect to be subject to suit in a forum such as that chosen 
by the plaintiffs. If, in addition, a sufficient portion of the transac­
tion underlying the lawsuit occurred in the forum,207 then it 
would clearly be reasonable to require the defendant to appear 
there. 
Cases such as Briggs 208 and Driver 209 may require a somewhat 
different conclusion. In Briggs all of the events relating to the 
grand jury proceeding took place in Florida and three of the four 
defendants apparently resided there.210 The plaintiffs were called 
to testify in Florida and resided in a number of different states, 
but none resided in the District of Columbia where the suit was 
brought.211 The only connection the case had with the District of 
Columbia was that the fourth defendant had his official residence 
there.212 In these circumstances it would be inconsistent with due 
process to require the Florida defendants to appear in the District 
of Columbia. The events took place in Florida, three of the de­
fendants resided there and the alleged improper activity of all the 
defendants occurred there. In addition, the plaintiffs' residences 
would not indicate any compelling reason for litigating in the Dis­
trict of Columbia. Under these circumstances due process should 
require that the suit be brought in Florida with the nationwide 
207. The court specifically left open whether any of the defendant's argu­
ments might be relevant to the question of proper venue in the district since 
section 27 requires an act or transaction constituting the violation to have oc­
curred in the district. [d. at 334-35 & n. 7. 
208. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds 
. sub nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). See supra text accompanying 
notes 42-48. One aspect of suits under the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 
may place cases such as Briggs and Driver in a special category. Since the 
Supreme Court ruled that defendants were not subject to damages under the 
Act, the result is that in most cases officers will only be sued for mandamus while 
they are in office. See 444 U.S. at 543-44. As such the local United States Attor­
ney's Office and the Justice Department will bear most of the burdens of litiga­
tion, and the officer will only rarely have to appear and, then, at government 
expense. /d. The realities of this type of case will presumably tip the balance in 
plaintiff's favor in most instances, while not changing the fact that the balancing 
must be done. 
209. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 147 (1st 
Cir. 1978), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). 
For a further discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 49-58. For a special 
caveat in this type of case, see supra note 208. 
210. Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) 
(No. 77-1546). 
211. Six of the plaintiffs resided in Florida, two in Texas, one in Delaware 
and one in New York. [d. at 4. 
212. 444 U.S. at 532. This defendant joined the other defendants in re­
questing the case be transferred to the Northern District of Florida. /d. at 531 
n.2. 
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service provision being used to require the District of Columbia 
defendant to appear in the appropriate federal court located in 
that state. 
In Driver the basis for bringing the class action in Rhode Is­
land Federal District Court was that it was the residence of one of 
the representative plaintiffs.213 All of the alleged improper inter­
ference with the plaintiffs' mail occurred in New York City.214 
Consequently, the defendants could argue that there was no rea­
sonable basis for this case to be heard in Rhode Island. However, 
the plaintiffs might respond that the defendants' interference with 
their mail constituted multistate activity which had an impact in 
the locale where the letters were mailed. As a result, the defend­
ants should reasonably expect to litigate these questions where 
their actions had an impact. Since Rhode Island was apparently 
such a place,215 great weight should be given to the plaintiffs' 
choice of forum. This should be especially so, if the defendants 
failed to show any particular burdens on them. Relevant to this 
latter question would be whether there would be any discovery or 
trial problems raised by a Rhode Island forum. This would ap­
pear to be the most difficult case of the group for the court to 
make a determination. However, in light of the congressional 
presumption in favor of plaintiffs' choice of forum, it would seem 
that a strong argument could be made for allowing the case to 
continue in Rhode Island. 
In all of these cases, it might be necessary for the court to 
allow the parties preliminary discovery to ascertain additional 
facts. This was apparently not done in these cases because of the 
limited standards of fifth amendment due process which the 
courts felt obliged to use. Once the appropriate information is 
before the court it could make a careful review of all the factual 
permutations in the particular situation in deciding whether to 
dismiss or transfer the action.216 Such a determination would not 
be made based upon a wooden analysis of whether there was ade-
213. The other plaintiffs who represented the class were residents of New 
York, Minnesota. Connecticut and California. 577 F.2d at 149 n.2. 
214. ld. at 149 n.3. 
215. Driver, 74 F.R.D. at 400 n.23. 
216. It is clear that in the absence of personal jurisdiction. a federal court 
has the option to transfer the case in the interests of justice to a district that can 
properly assert jurisdiction. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman. 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 
(1962); 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE­
DURE § 3827, at 171 (1976); Comment, Change of Venue in Absence of PersonalJuris­
diction Under 28 U.S.c. 1404(a) and 1406(a), 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 735 (1963). 
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quate notice, but rather on a more supple consideration of all the 
components relevant to due process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, Congress has the power to authorize na­
tionwide service of process, but that power should be limited by 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In establishing 
the. restrictions on this congressional power, the courts have 
failed to establish meaningful due process requirements. Consis­
tent with what the Supreme Court has established as the functions 
of a due process analysis in state-court jurisdiction cases, it is 
clear that this congressional power should be limited by a case by 
case analysis of the fairness of a forum to hear a particular matter. 
Such an analysis will require a careful review of the relations of 
the plaintiff, defendant and the transaction involved in the litiga­
tion in order to ensure that the defendant receives the protection 
to which he is entitled under the Constitution. 
HeinOnline -- 33 Vill. L. Rev. 48 1988
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